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SYMPOSIUM: DISABILITY RIGHTS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
CHALLENGING TRANSITION-RELATED CARE EXCLUSIONS
THROUGH DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
Kevin M. Barry*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the growing visibility and acceptance of transgender people, discrimination against
them persists.1 Transgender people are routinely denied identity documents that accurately
reflect their sex.2 They are excluded from service in the U.S. military and from the protections of
state civil rights laws. 3 They are fired from their jobs, evicted from their homes, turned away
*

Kevin M. Barry, Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. The author is grateful to Noah
Lewis, Jennifer Levi, Shannon Minter, Jillian Weiss, Amy Whelan, and Ezra Young for their outstanding legal
advocacy and thoughtful comments on briefing that formed the basis for this Essay. Thanks to the U.D.C. Law
Review staff for editorial assistance, and to Danielle Combs, Brittany Ignace, Carmel Joseph, Jeff Kaplan, Kat
Merino, Virginia Paino, Kim Pisani, and Lindsay Preece for research assistance. For further information on the
development of disability rights protection for gender dysphoria, see Kevin M. Barry, Themed Issue: The Tenth
Anniversary of the ADA Amendments Act—Challenging Inaccurate Sex Designations On Birth Certificates Through
Disability Rights Law, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313 (2019); Kevin M. Barry & Jennifer L. Levi,
Symposium: Contemporary Issues In Disability Rights Law—The Future of Disability Protections for Transgender
People, 35 TOURO L. REV. 25 (2019); Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and a New Path
for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J.F. 373 (2017); Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender
People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507 (2016); THE ADA PROJECT, Gender Dysphoria
Discrimination (2019), http://www.adalawproject.org/gender-dysphoria-discrimination.
1
See generally Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey (2016)
[hereinafter 2015 Trans Survey], https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-ReportFINAL.PDF; Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price Minter, Legal Issues, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A
RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY (2014).
2
See, e.g., Movement Advancement Project, Identity Document Laws and Policies,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/identity_document_laws/name_change (last visited Dec. 19, 2019)
(discussing barriers to updating one’s name and gender on driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and other identity
documents); see also 2015 Trans Survey, supra note 1, at 81-91 (discussing barriers to changing one’s name and
identity on government-issued identity documents); Broadus & Minter, supra note 1, at 174-80 (same); see also
Kevin M. Barry, Themed Issue: The Tenth Anniversary of the ADA Amendments Act—Challenging Inaccurate Sex
Designations On Birth Certificates Through Disability Rights Law, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313, 315–16
(2019) (discussing “restrictive birth certificate laws that require people to undergo gender confirmation surgery . . .
in order to change the sex designation on their birth certificates”).
3
See Jennifer L. Levi & Kevin M. Barry, Transgender Tropes & Constitutional Review, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 589, 627 (discussing North Carolina’s passage of two successive laws that “prohibit[] municipalities from
passing new or amended anti-discrimination ordinances to protect transgender people”) (internal quotation marks
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from homeless shelters, denied custody of their children, harassed by law enforcement, and
deprived of access to appropriate single-sex services in schools, prisons, and immigration
detention centers—because they are transgender. 4
Another area in which transgender people experience discrimination is healthcare—
specifically, the denial of coverage for transition-related care such as hormone therapy and
surgery.5 In a recent national survey of nearly 30,000 transgender people, 91% of respondents
reported that they wanted transition-related medical care at some point in their lives, but only
65% of respondents reported actually receiving such care.6 One of the primary reasons those who
desire transition-related care do not receive such care is the denial of insurance coverage. 7 Many
private insurance plans have archaic provisions that exclude transition-related care based on the
discredited assumption that such care “is ‘cosmetic’ or ‘experimental.’” 8 Indeed, more than half
(55%) of respondents in the national survey who sought insurance coverage for transition-related
surgery were denied, and one-quarter (25%) of those who sought coverage for hormones were
denied. 9
In addition to public education campaigns and legislative and administrative advocacy, 10 the
transgender community has relied on impact litigation to dismantle transition-related care
exclusions. Advocates have successfully argued that such exclusions constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1557 of the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 11 In several cases, advocates have pursued an additional legal theory:
omitted); id. at 640 (discussing U.S. Department of Defense’s enforcement of transgender military service ban
beginning on Apr. 12, 2019).
4
See generally 2015 Trans Survey, supra note 1 (discussing various forms of discrimination that transgender
people experience). Tragically, the mistreatment of transgender people extends beyond discrimination to physical
violence, including disproportionately high rates of physical attacks, sexual assault, and intimate partner violence—
especially among people of color and those working in the underground economy. Id. at 197, 209.
5
Id. at 95; see also id. at 232 (“When asked about what they believed the most important policy priorities were
for transgender people, respondents [in the 2015 Trans Survey] most often identified addressing violence against
transgender people (25%), health insurance coverage (15%), and racism (11%) as their top priorities.”) (emphasis
added).
6
Id.
7
2015 Trans Survey, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing “barriers to accessing quality, affordable health care,”
including a “lack of adequate insurance coverage”).
8
See Broadus & Minter, supra note 1, at 182.
9
2015 Trans Survey, supra note 1, at 95.
10
See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing Human Rights Campaign’s Corporate Equality
Index and state laws and policies that prohibit the exclusion of transition-related care in public and private health
insurance).
11
Numerous courts have concluded that transition-related care exclusions constitute sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, and the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Tovar v. Essentia Health, 857 F.3d 771, 775-76 (8th Cir. 2017) (assuming that third
party administrator could be held liable for sex discrimination under Title VII for administering a self-funded plan
that excluded transition-related care, but dismissing claim because the challenged discrimination was not based on
the employee’s own protected characteristic, but rather the characteristic of her transgender son); Toomey v. State of
Arizona, No. CV-19-00035, 2019 WL 7172144, at *5-6, *8-9 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2019) (holding that plaintiff stated
claim that transition-related care exclusion in state employee health plan violated Title VII and Equal Protection
Clause); Tovar v. Essentia Health, 342 F. Supp. 3d 947, 954 (D. Minn. 2018) (holding that third party administrator
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transition-related care exclusions constitute disability discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), its predecessor, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(“Section 504”), and the ACA.12 Specifically, advocates argue, such exclusions discriminate
based on gender dysphoria—the clinically significant distress experienced by transgender people
who cannot live consistent with their gender identity. 13
Although underdeveloped in the legal literature,14 disability theory is an important tool for
the advancement of transgender rights, particularly given the uncertain fate of sex discrimination
protections for transgender people under a newly constituted Supreme Court15 and the success of
transgender litigants in securing protection under disability rights laws. 16

could be held liable for sex discrimination under ACA for administering a self-funded plan that excluded transitionrelated care), on remand from 857 F.3d 771; Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 997 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (holding
that transition-related care exclusion in Wisconsin state employee health plan was sex discrimination under Title VII
and the ACA); Flack v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1014-15, 1021-22 (W.D. Wis.
2019) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because state Medicaid exclusion of transition-related care
constituted, inter alia, sex discrimination under ACA and Equal Protection Clause); see also Amic. Br. of Equal
Employment Opp. Comm’n in Support of Plaintiff and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Robinson
v. Dignity Health, No. 4:16-cv-03035-YGR (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) (arguing that employer’s exclusion of
transition-related care in self-funded health insurance plan constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII);
cf. Prescott v. Rady Children’s Hosp.-San Diego, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that hospital’s
refusal to provide transition-related care to transgender patient constituted sex discrimination under ACA); accord
Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14–cv–2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *15 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (same).
12
See Compl. ¶11, Lange v. Houston Cty., No. 5:19-CV-00392 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Lange
Compl.]; Complaint for Damages ¶6, Musgrove v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 3:18-cv-00080
(M.D. Ga. June 28, 2018) [hereinafter Musgrove Compl.]; Complaint ¶101, Doe v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-640
(S.D. Ill. June 14, 2016); Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal at 2, Manning v. OPM, No. 0120161068
(E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2016); see also Kevin M. Barry & Jennifer L. Levi, The Future of Disability Rights Protections
for Transgender People, 35 TOURO L. REV. 25, 68-71 (2019) (discussing same).
13
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451–53 (5th ed.
2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (“Gender dysphoria refers to the distress that may accompany the incongruence between
one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender. Although not all individuals will experience
distress as a result of such incongruence, many are distressed if the desired physical interventions by means of
hormones and/or surgery are not available.”).
14
For helpful analyses of this emerging issue, see Transcend Legal, Memorandum to Plan Administrators, at 4
& n.16 (June 24, 2019) [hereinafter Transcend Legal Mem.],
https://transcendlegal.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Memo%20on%20transgender%20health%20insurance%20exclu
sions.pdf, Kevin M. Barry & Jennifer L. Levi, The Future of Disability Rights Protections for Transgender People,
35 TOURO LAW REVIEW 25 (2019), and B. Schaaff, Using Federal Nondiscrimination Laws To Avoid ERISA:
Securing Protection From Transgender Discrimination In Employee Health Benefit Plans, 26 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 45 (2018).
15
See Adam Liptak and Jeremy W. Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether Civil Rights Act Protects
L.G.B.T. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019) (discussing, inter alia, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107).
16
See, e.g., Doe v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403, at *8 (D. Mass. June 14,
2018) (holding that transgender inmate stated claim that department of corrections violated, inter alia, the ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, and Equal Protection Clause by placing her “into a prison environment that is contrary to a
critical aspect of [her] prescribed treatment (that [she] be allowed to live as . . . a woman”)); see also infra note 81
(collecting cases).
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This Article considers the use of disability rights laws to challenge transition-related care
exclusions. Part I provides context for this challenge by discussing transgender status, its
relationship to the diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and the growing trend toward coverage for
transition-related care in public and private health insurance.17 Building on the briefing in several
district court cases,18 Part II analyzes why the refusal of employers and insurance companies to
cover transition-related care violates disability rights laws. 19 This Article concludes that there is
no legitimate reason to deny insurance coverage for transition-related care.20 Such care is
medically necessary and effective treatment for gender dysphoria, 21 and its costs are
“immaterial,” given the small fraction of people who utilize such care. 22 The only conceivable
purpose for denying coverage for transition-related care is its effect: to single out transgender
people for inferior medical coverage, and to avoid paying for a stigmatized form of health care. 23
I.

TRANSGENDER STATUS, GENDER DYSPHORIA, AND TRANSITION-RELATED CARE

A transgender person is someone whose assigned sex at birth, as determined by the
appearance of one’s physical sex characteristics, does not match one’s gender identity, that is,
the innate, internal sense of being male, female, or some category other than male or female (also
referred to as “brain sex”). 24 Typically, people born with the physical characteristics of males are
psychologically male, and those with the physical characteristics of females are psychologically
female. However, for a transgender person, body and brain do not match. 25 The burgeoning
medical research suggests that biological factors, most notably sexual differentiation in the brain,
have a role in gender identity development. 26 According to recent estimates, there are
17

See infra notes 24-57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 (discussing Lange v. Houston Cty., Musgrove v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
Doe v. United States, and Manning v. OPM).
19
See infra notes 58-228 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
21
See infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing medical consensus that hormonal and surgical treatment
to align physical sex characteristics with one’s gender identity is medically necessary and successful in alleviating
gender dysphoria).
22
See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (citing Flack v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services,
395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1021-22 (W.D. Wis. 2019) and Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 1000-01 (W.D. Wis.
2018)).
23
See Lange Compl. ¶105, supra note 12.
24
2015 Trans Survey, supra note 1, at 40; see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
BATHROOM/FACILITY ACCESS AND TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEES, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fsbathroom-access-transgender.cfm (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (“‘Transgender’ refers to people whose gender
identity and/or expression is different from the sex assigned to them at birth.”); DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451
(stating that gender identity “refers to an individual’s identification as male, female, or . . . some category other than
male or female.”). In addition to transgender men and women, the transgender community includes “people who are
non-binary, which is a term that is often used to describe people whose gender identity is not exclusively male or
female, including those who identify as having no gender, a gender other than male or female, or more than one
gender.” 2015 TRANS SURVEY, supra note 1, at 6-7.
25
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 452–53.
26
See, e.g., CHRISTINE MICHELLE DUFFY, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16–77 (Christine Michelle Duffy ed., 2014) (discussing recent medical
studies pointing to biological etiology for transgender identity); Randi Kaufman, Introduction to Transgender
Identity and Health, FENWAY GUIDE TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH 331, 337–38
(Harvey J. Makadon et al., 2d. ed. 2008) (“The predominating biological theory suggests that a neurohormonal
18
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approximately 1.4 million transgender adults living in the United States—0.6 percent of the adult
population.27
For transgender individuals who cannot live consistent with their gender identity, the
incongruence between assigned sex and gender identity may result in gender dysphoria, which is
a feeling of stress and discomfort with one’s assigned sex. 28 Gender dysphoria, if clinically
significant and persistent, is a serious medical condition. 29 According to the fifth edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM-5”), gender dysphoria is characterized by: (1) a marked incongruence between one’s
gender identity and one’s assigned sex, which is often accompanied by a strong desire to be rid
of one’s primary and secondary sex characteristics and/or to acquire primary/secondary sex
characteristics of the other gender; and (2) intense emotional pain and suffering resulting from
this incongruence.30 If left medically untreated, gender dysphoria can result in debilitating
depression, anxiety, suicidality, and death. 31 In addition to the negative health conditions directly
attributable to gender dysphoria, people with gender dysphoria are frequently subjected to
disturbance takes place in the brain during embryological development. While the genitalia of the human embryo
become differentiated as male or female during the 12th week of fetal development, the gender identity portion of
the brain differentiates around the 16th week. If there is a hormonal imbalance during this four-week period, gender
identity may not develop along the same lines as the genitalia.”); Milton Diamond, Biased-Interaction Theory of
Psychosexual Development: “How Does One Know if One Is Male or Female?,” 55 SEX ROLES 589, 596 (2006)
(“During prenatal development the nervous system, the brain in particular, is programmed along a track that is
usually concomitant with the development of other sex appropriate structures like genitals and reproductive organs.
The brain, however, as in other [i]ntersex conditions, can develop along one sex/gender path while other organs
develop along another. Put simply, the brain can develop as male while other parts of the body develop as female.”);
see also Sec. Statement of Int. of U.S. at 3-4, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16,
2015), ECF No. 67 [hereinafter DOJ Blatt Stat. of Int.] (compiling studies supporting “biologic etiology for
transgender identity”); Aruna Saraswat, Jamie D. Weinand & Joshua D. Safer, Evidence Supporting the Biologic
Nature of Gender Identity, 21 ENDOCRINE PRAC. 199, 199–202 (Feb. 2, 2015) (providing a review of data in support
of a “fixed, biologic basis for gender identity” and concluding that “current data suggest a biologic etiology for
transgender identity”).
27
Andrew R. Flores et al., How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the U.S.?, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE 2
(June 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgenderin-the-United-States.pdf; see also Br. of Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Med’l Assoc. and Seven Other Health Care
Organizations in Support of Pls.-Appellees at 2, Doe 2 v. Trump, No. 18-5257 (Oct. 29, 2018) [hereinafter AMA
Amic. Br.], available at https://notransmilitaryban.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/doe-v-trump-brief-of-ama.pdf
(same).
28
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (“Gender dysphoria as a general descriptive term refers to an individual’s
affective/cognitive discontent with the assigned gender but is more specifically defined when used as a diagnostic
category.”).
29
Id. at 454; see also AMA Amic. Br., supra note 27, at 8-9.
30
See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 452 (“The condition is associated with clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”). The World Health Organization’s
International Classification of Diseases similarly recognizes the medical condition of “gender incongruence,” which
is characterized “by a marked and persistent incongruence between an individual’s experienced gender and the
assigned sex, which often leads to a desire to ‘transition’, in order to live and be accepted as a person of the
experienced gender, through hormonal treatment, surgery or other health care services to make the individual’s body
align, as much as desired and to the extent possible, with the experienced gender.” HA60 Gender Incongruence of
Adolescence or Adulthood, ICD-11 FOR MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY STATISTICS (Apr. 2019),
https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f90875286.
31
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 454–55.
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discrimination in multiple areas of their lives (e.g., housing, employment, school, healthcare, and
interactions with police and other government officials) that exacerbates these negative health
outcomes.32
Gender dysphoria, like most medical conditions, can be ameliorated through medical
treatment.33 The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”), an
interdisciplinary professional and educational organization devoted to transgender health, has
established internationally-accepted Standards of Care (“SOC”) for the treatment of people with
gender dysphoria.34 Pursuant to the SOC, individuals with gender dysphoria undergo a medically
necessary and supervised gender transition in order to live life consistent with their brain sex and
alleviate the distress caused by gender dysphoria.35
The transition process has three main components—social, pharmacological, and surgical. 36
Social transition involves bringing a transgender person’s gender expression and social sex role
into alignment with the person’s gender identity.37 The transition may include wearing clothes,
using a different name and pronouns, and interacting with peers and one’s social environment in
a manner that matches one’s gender identity.38 Pharmacological transition involves taking
medications that change the body’s hormone balance to be consistent with one’s gender
identity.39 For example, a transgender man would take medications that reduce estrogen and
replace those hormones with testosterone, which will further masculinize their sex
characteristics.40 Lastly, a transgender person may pursue surgical treatment to bring their
32
Id. at 458 (“Gender dysphoria . . . is associated with high levels of stigmatization, discrimination, and
victimization, leading to negative self-concept, increased rates of mental disorder comorbidity, school dropout, and
economic marginalization, including unemployment, with attendant social and mental health risks, especially in
individuals from resource-poor family backgrounds. In addition, these individuals’ access to health services and
mental health services may be impeded by structural barriers, such as institutional discomfort or inexperience in
working with this patient population.”); 2015 TRANS SURVEY, supra note 1, at 19 (“This report demonstrates that
transgender people continue to face discrimination in numerous areas that significantly impact quality of life,
financial stability, and emotional wellbeing, including employment, education, housing, and health care.
Furthermore, many respondents experienced discrimination in multiple areas of their lives, the cumulative effect of
which leads to severe economic and emotional hardship and can in turn have devastating effects on other outcome
areas, such as health and safety.”).
33
See WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE 5 (7th ed. 2012),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards of Care V7 - 2011 WPATH (2)(1).pdf
[hereinafter SOC].
34
The SOC were originally approved in 1979 and have undergone seven revisions through 2012. SOC, supra
note 33, at 1. “Many of the major medical and mental health groups in the United States,” including the American
Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological
Association, “expressly recognize the WPATH Standards of Care as representing the consensus of the medical and
mental health community regarding the appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria.” AMA Amic. Br., supra note
27, at 10-11.
35
See SOC, supra note 33, at 9-10.
36
Id.
37
See id. at 9; see also AMA Amic. Br., supra note 27, at 11.
38
See Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender
Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 863 (2015).
39
SOC, supra note 33, at 9, 36-38.
40
Id. at 37.
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physical sex characteristics into conformity with their gender identity. 41 This may include
surgery to increase breast size or create a more masculine chest contour, and surgeries performed
on genitals or reproductive organs. 42 The precise medical treatments required to alleviate a
particular person’s gender dysphoria will vary based on individualized medical needs. 43
A well-established medical consensus, supported by sixty years of clinical experience, finds
that hormonal and surgical treatment to align physical sex characteristics with one’s gender
identity is medically necessary and successful in alleviating gender dysphoria. 44 According to the
American Medical Association, health experts in gender dysphoria “have rejected the myth that
such treatments are ‘cosmetic’ or ‘experimental’ and have recognized that these treatments can
provide safe and effective treatment for a serious health condition.” 45 Courts have likewise
recognized the necessity of transition-related care to assist individuals with gender dysphoria. All
nine of the U.S. Courts of Appeals that have been presented with the question have either
concluded or assumed without deciding that gender dysphoria poses a “serious medical need” for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, and no court of appeals has held otherwise. 46
41

Id. at 10, 54-55, 57.
Id. at 57; see also Jules Chyten-Brennan, Surgical Transition, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A
RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY ch. 13 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014).
43
SOC, supra note 33, at 5 (“Treatment is individualized: What helps one person alleviate gender dysphoria
might be very different from what helps another person.”).
44
See, e.g., SOC, supra note 33, at 8 (“[H]ormone therapy and surgery have been found to be medically
necessary to alleviate gender dysphoria in many people.”); DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (“[M]any are distressed if
the desired physical interventions by means of hormones and/or surgery are not available.”) (emphasis added); Am.
Med. Ass’n, Removing Financial Barriers To Care For Transgender Patients 1 (2008),
http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama_resolutions.pdf [perma.cc/H2FE-3PYT] (stating that “an established body of
medical research demonstrates the effectiveness and medical necessity of mental health care, hormone therapy and
sex reassignment surgery as forms of therapeutic treatment” for those diagnosed with gender dysphoria); accord
Position Statements of the American Psychiatric Association: Access to Care for Transgender and Gender Variant
Individuals, ASS’N OF LGBTQ PSYCHIATRISTS (2013), http://www.aglp.org/pages/LGBTPositionStatements.php
[perma.cc/H7ZF-WCHP]; Transgender, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (2008), http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx; AMA Amic. Br., supra note 27,
at 10 (“Medical experts agree that transition-related care is ‘reliable, safe, and effective.’”); WPATH, Position
Statement on Medical Necessity of Treatment, Sex Reassignment, and Insurance Coverage in the U.S.A. (Dec.
2016), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/Policies/WPATH-Position-on-MedicalNecessity-12-21-2016.pdf (“[G]ender affirming/confirming treatments and surgical procedures, properly indicated
and performed as provided by the Standards of Care, have proven to be beneficial and effective in the treatment of
individuals with transsexualism or gender dysphoria.”); Decl. George Richard Brown, MD, DFAPA in Supp. of
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. to Dissolve the Prelim. Injunc., Doe v. Trump, at 4-5 ¶¶ 13-14 (May 11,
2018), https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/dvt-george-r-brown-declaration-5-11-18.pdf (“[T]he
consensus of the mainstream medical community [is] that gender dysphoria is amenable to treatment through social
and medical transition. The American Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, the American Psychiatric
Association, and the American Psychological Association all agree that medical treatment for gender dysphoria is
medically necessary and effective. Sixty years of clinical experience and data have demonstrated the efficacy of
treatment for the distress resulting from gender dysphoria . . . .”) (citations omitted); id. at 2 ¶ 8 (“[G]ender
dysphoria . . . is curable through appropriate medical care that allows the individual to live consistently with their
gender identity. . . .).
45
AM. MED. ASS’N, REMOVING FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS 1 (2008),
http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama_resolutions.pdf.
46
See, e.g., O’Donnabhain v. C.I.R., 134 T.C. 34, 69 (2010) (holding that the costs of transition-related care are
tax deductible, and stating that “[t]he evidence is clear that a substantial segment of the psychiatric profession has
42
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Accordingly, transition-related care for gender dysphoria is widely covered under public and
private health insurance plans.47 With respect to public insurance: in 2014, the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services eliminated its decades-old exclusion of transition-related care
under Medicare48 and the overwhelming majority of Medicaid programs—forty-three states and
the District of Columbia—have either removed or never adopted exclusions of transition-related
care in their Medicaid programs. 49 Additionally, the federal Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”) prohibits the exclusion of transition-related care in federal employee health plans 50 and
seventeen states and the District of Columbia provide for coverage for transition-related care in
state employee health plans. 51 As for private insurance, twenty states and the District of
Columbia prohibit the exclusion of transition-related care in individual health insurance plans
and employer-sponsored fully-insured health insurance plans.52 Nearly three-quarters (73%) of
the 1,028 private-sector businesses surveyed in the Human Rights Campaign’s 2019 Corporate
Equality Index—which includes nearly two-thirds of Fortune 500 businesses—have eliminated
been persuaded of the advisability and efficacy of hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery as treatment for
[gender dysphoria], as have many courts. . . . [Such procedures] are undertaken by [people with gender dysphoria] in
an effort to alleviate the distress and suffering occasioned by [gender dysphoria], and . . . have positive results in this
regard in the opinion of many in the psychiatric profession.”); see also id. (collecting cases); Transcend Legal Mem.,
supra note 14, at 4 & n.16 (June 24, 2019).
47
Globally, transition-related care has long been standard in national health plans, including in Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Iran, and the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Transcend Legal Mem., supra note 14, at 6-7. The Council of Europe has likewise passed a
resolution calling on member states to “make gender reassignment procedures, such as hormone treatment, surgery
and psychological support, accessible for transgender people, and ensure that they are reimbursed by public health
insurance schemes.” Id.
48
NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. App. Div., Decision No. 2576, at 1,
9-10, 2014 WL 2558402, at *1, *7-8 (May 30, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2576.pdf
(eliminating exclusion for transition-related surgery).
49
Movement Advancement Project, Healthcare Laws and Policies: Medicaid, www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
50
U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., FEHB Program Carrier Letter No. 2015-12, Covered Benefits for Gender
Transition Services (June 23, 2015), https://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/carriers/2015/201512.pdf (“[N]o carrier participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program may have a general exclusion
of services, drugs or supplies related to gender transition or ‘sex transformations.’”).
51
Movement Advancement Project, Healthcare Laws and Policies: State Employee Benefits,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
52
Movement Advancement Project, Healthcare Laws and Policies: Private Insurance, at
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). Importantly, these
state laws do not apply to employer sponsored self-insured plans. See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE, No. 915.002, at n.3
(June 8, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 EEOC Guidance], https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html (distinguishing
employer-sponsored “insured” health insurance plans, which are “purchased from an insurance company or other
organization, such as a health maintenance organization” and are “regulated by both [the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)] and state law,” from “self-insured” health plans, in which the employer
directly assumes the liability of an insurer, and which are “typically subject to ERISA, but are not subject to state
laws that regulate insurance”). ERISA “is a federal law that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established
retirement and health plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans.” See U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, HEALTH PLANS & BENEFITS: ERISA, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa (last visited
Dec. 19, 2019).
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all transition-related care exclusions from their employer-sponsored health insurance plans,
finding the cost of such coverage “negligible.”53 Insurance companies have overwhelmingly
eliminated transition-related care exclusions from individual health insurance plans, 54 and all
major insurance companies administer employer-sponsored self-funded health insurance plans
that will cover transition-related care.55
Notwithstanding this trend toward coverage for transition-related care in public and private
health insurance, significant gaps remain—particularly with respect to employer-sponsored selffunded health insurance.56 Despite widespread recognition of the medical necessity of transitionrelated care and the lack of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for singling out such care for
exclusion, insurance companies continue to offer—and employers continue to purchase—selffunded health insurance plans that exclude transition-related care.57 In response, transgender
employees have successfully argued that these exclusions constitute discrimination based on
gender dysphoria in violation of disability rights laws—a topic to which this Essay now turns.

53

Human Rights Campaign, Corp. Equality Index 2019, at 14 (July 30, 2019) [hereinafter HRC CEI],
https://www.hrc.org/campaigns/corporate-equality-index; see also id. 5-6, 14, 24 (stating that 752 of 1029
responding businesses eliminated transition-related care exclusions from all health plans, as did at least 193 of 346
responding Fortune 500 companies). Colleges and universities have likewise removed transition-related care
exclusions from student and staff health insurance plans. See Campus Pride, Trans Policy Clearinghouse: Colleges
and Universities that Cover Transition-Related Medical Expenses under Student Health Insurance (2018),
www.campuspride.org/tpc-student-health-insurance (“88 colleges and universities cover hormones and genderaffirming surgeries for students.”); Campus Pride, Cover Transition-Related Medical Expenses Under Employee
Health Insurance, https://www.campuspride.org/tpc/employee-health/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (“55 colleges and
universities cover hormones and/or gender reassignment/confirmation surgeries for employees.”).
54
See Out2Enroll, Summary of Findings: 2018 Marketplace Plan Compliance with Section 1557,
https://www.out2enroll.org/out2enroll/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Overview-of-Trans-Exclusions-in-2018Marketplace-Plans-1.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (surveying 500 individual health insurance plans across 18
states and finding that 90% of such plans did not exclude transition-related care).
55
See Transcend Legal, Transgender Insurance Medical Polices, https://transcendlegal.org/health-insurancemedical-policies (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (collecting over 135 insurance company clinical guidelines regarding
coverage for transition-related care in self-funded plans); see, e.g., Aetna, Gender Reassignment Surgery (listing
criteria for coverage of transition-related care in self-funded plans).
56
In a self-insured plan, “the employer directly assumes the liability of an insurer,” see 1993 EEOC Guidance,
supra note 52, at n.3., and “usually contracts with a third-party administrator (‘TPA’), often an insurance company,”
to manage the plan’s day-to-day operations. America’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1344
(N.D. Ga. 2012); see, e.g., Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Insurance companies such as [Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.] often act as third-party administrators to carry
out the daily operations of employers’ self-funded plans, since insurance companies already have operations in place
to process claims, collect employee premiums, and manage enrollment.”).
57
See Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price Minter, Legal Issues, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A
RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 182 (2014) (“Many private insurance plans still have provisions
that exclude treatments for gender transition. These exclusions are often based on the [outdated and inaccurate]
classification of gender transition treatments as ‘cosmetic’ or ‘experimental.’”); see also 2015 TRANS SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 95 (“More than half (55%) of respondents who sought transition-related surgery coverage were
denied, and one-quarter (25%) of those who sought coverage for hormones were denied.”).
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II.

THE EXCLUSION OF TRANSITION-RELATED CARE VIOLATES DISABILITY RIGHTS
LAWS

The ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Section 1557 of the ACA collectively
prohibit employers and health insurers (including those acting as third party administrators58)
from excluding transition-related care from health insurance plans. 59 Specifically, when an
employer excludes transition-related care from its employer-sponsored health insurance plans,
the employer violates Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in
employment.60 If the employer receives federal funds, the employer also violates Section 504,
which prohibits disability discrimination by any entity receiving federal financial assistance. 61
When a health insurer offers or administers a discriminatory health insurance plan, it violates
Titles I and III of the ADA, the latter of which prohibits disability discrimination in public
accommodations, as well as Section 1557 of the ACA, which prohibits federally-funded health
programs from discriminating based on, inter alia, disability. 62
Generally speaking, in order to prevail under these disability anti-discrimination statutes, a
person must establish that: (A) one is protected by the statute, i.e., one is a qualified individual
with a disability; (B) one was subjected to discrimination by reason of one’s disability; and (C) the
statute applies to the defendant, i.e., the defendant is a covered entity. 63 This Part discusses each
requirement in turn.

See supra note 56 (discussing health insurers’ role in administering employer-sponsored self-funded health
insurance).
59
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12182 (2018) (Titles I and III of ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018) (Section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018) (Section 1557 of ACA) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018)).
60
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018) (prohibiting employment discrimination). If the public employer is a “State or
local government” or any “other instrumentality of a State or States or local government,” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)(B) (2018), Title II may also apply. Compare, e.g., Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation
Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Title II of the ADA encompasses public employment discrimination.”),
with Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Title I to public employers but
declining to apply Title II); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.108 (2019) (DOJ ADA Title II regulation regarding employment
discrimination). Additionally, if a public employer receives federal funds, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
would apply. See infra notes 147-51 (discussing Section 504).
61
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1) (2018) (prohibiting discrimination by a “program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance”).
62
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12182(2018) (prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodations,
respectively); 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination in health programs).
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12182 (2018) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act); 42
U.S.C. § 18116 (2018) (Section 1557 of ACA) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 794); see, e.g., Muhammad v. Ct. of
Common Pleas of Allegheny Cty., 483 Fed. App’x 759, 762 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing nearly identical analyses of
ADA and Section 504); accord Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]ll the leading
cases take up the [ADA and Section 504] together, as will we.”), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998); see also infra note 109
and accompanying text (collecting cases).
58
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A.

A Person with Gender Dysphoria Who is Denied Transition-Related Care is a Qualified
Individual with a Disability

In order to claim the protection of Title I of the ADA, one must be a “qualified individual”
with a “disability.”64 Generally, the question of whether a person is a “qualified individual” is
not at issue in the context of transition-related care exclusions because there is no dispute that the
individual “can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds.”65 In short, with respect to the exclusion of coverage for transition-related care, the issue
is whether the denial of the benefit is discriminatory, not whether the plaintiff is eligible to
receive the benefit.
For nearly two decades, proving “disability” under the ADA was extraordinarily difficult as a
result of several Supreme Court decisions that “narrowed the broad scope of protection intended
to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress
intended to protect.”66 This is no longer the case. As amended by the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (“ADAAA”), the ADA’s definition of disability is to be “construed in favor of broad
coverage.”67 Specifically, the three-prong definition protects any person: (1) with a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits—or that would, when considered in its active state
and without regard to treatment, substantially limit—a major life activity or bodily function; (2)
who has a “record of”—that is, a history of—“such an impairment”; or (3) who is “regarded as
having such an impairment,” which is defined to mean being subjected to discrimination based
on a real or perceived physical or mental impairment—regardless of whether it substantially
limits a major life activity. 68 Section 504 and, by extension, Section 1557, explicitly incorporate
the ADA’s definition of disability, as amended. 69

64
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018); accord 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). Title III of the ADA does not require that an
individual with a disability be “qualified” to receive the goods and services of a place of public accommodation. 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2018).
65
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2018).
66
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 110–325, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553 [hereinafter
ADAAA].
67
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2018); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2019) (“[T]he definition of ‘disability’
in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms
of the ADA.”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.101(b) (2019) (same); ADAAA, supra note 66, at § 2(b)(1), (5) (“reinstating a broad
scope of protection to be available under the ADA” and stating that “the question of whether an individual’s
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis”).
68
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), (3)-(4) (2018).
69
The definition of disability under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is identical and,
therefore, the expanded definition of “disability” under the ADAAA applies with equal force to both statutes.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018) (defining “disability”), with 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), (20)(B) (2012) (crossreferencing ADA definition of “disability”); see also ADAAA, supra note 66, at § 7 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705
(2018)) (conforming Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “disability” to definition of disability “in
section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990”). Because Section 1557 incorporates Section 504’s antidiscrimination mandate, see 4 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018), the expanded definition of disability under the ADAAA
applies with equal force to Section 1557.
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Gender dysphoria easily meets this definition of “disability” under the ADA. Gender
dysphoria is a “physical . . . impairment”70 because it derives from an atypical interaction of sex
hormones and the developing brain, which results in a person being born with circulating
hormones inconsistent with the person’s brain sex. 71 Gender dysphoria is also a “mental
impairment” because, according to the DSM-5, gender dysphoria refers to clinically significant
distress with one’s assigned sex. 72
A person who has gender dysphoria satisfies the first prong of the definition of disability:
when considered in its active state and absent medical treatment, gender dysphoria would
substantially limit major life activities like caring for oneself, interacting with others, eating,
sleeping, concentrating, and communicating. 73 Gender dysphoria would also limit major bodily
functions, such as neurological and brain functions.74 Indeed, when left untreated, gender
dysphoria can result in depression, anxiety, suicidality, and death. 75 Furthermore, even with
medical treatment such as hormones and surgery, gender dysphoria substantially limits major life
activities such as reproduction.76
Similarly, under the second prong of the definition of disability, a person who has been
diagnosed with gender dysphoria has a “record of” a substantially limiting impairment and is
therefore protected by the ADA, even if they have successfully treated the condition. 77 Lastly,
and critically, a person who is refused transition-related care has been subjected to discrimination
based on gender dysphoria and is therefore protected under the broad “regarded as” prong of the
definition of disability. 78
One might argue that a person with gender dysphoria is categorically prohibited from
claiming the protection of the ADA because the ADA explicitly excludes from the definition of
disability “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments” (and
“transsexualism,” which has always been understood to be interchangeable with gender identity

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2019) (defining “physical . . . impairment” to mean a “physiological . . . condition
. . . affecting one or more body systems,” including “neurological . . . [and] endocrine”); accord 28 C.F.R. §
36.105(b)(1)(i) (2019).
71
See infra notes 89, 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing physical etiology of gender dysphoria).
72
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451-53.
73
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), (2)(a), (4) (2018); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), (j) (2019).
74
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(b) (2018); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (2019).
75
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 455-56.
76
See SOC, supra note 33, at 36-38 (discussing cessation of menses in people taking masculinizing hormones
and decreased sperm production in people taking feminizing hormones); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii) (2019) (“[T]he
non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated
with following a particular treatment regimen, may be considered when determining whether an individual’s
impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”) (emphasis added).
77
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2018); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2019).
78
Id. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment”
if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.”); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2019).
70
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disorder).79 As at least two major employers have conceded, 80 as four federal district courts have
held, 81 and as the U.S. Department of Justice has concluded under two successive
administrations—in three separate cases in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut—gender
dysphoria is not excluded under the ADA. 82 There are numerous reasons for this conclusion.
1.

Gender Dysphoria is a New and Distinct Diagnosis

Gender dysphoria is not excluded under the plain language of the ADA because, as the
District of Massachusetts recently observed in Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction,
gender dysphoria “is not merely another term for ‘gender identity disorder,’” but is rather a new
and distinct diagnosis with different diagnostic criteria. 83 In 2013, the DSM-5 replaced the
diagnosis of “gender identity disorders” with gender dysphoria. 84 This replacement was more
than semantic; the change reflects a substantive difference between the medical conditions
themselves. Unlike the outdated diagnosis of gender identity disorder, the hallmark or presenting
feature of gender dysphoria is not a person’s gender identity.85 Rather, it is the clinically
significant distress, termed dysphoria, that some people experience as a result of the mismatch
between their gender identity and their assigned sex. 86 Reflecting this distinction, the diagnostic
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2018); see Duffy, supra note 26, at 16–48 (“It was not uncommon at the time [the
ADA was being debated] for people to use the terms ‘transsexualism’ and ‘GID’ interchangeably.”); see also id. at
16–98 to 16–103 (explaining that, beginning in 1980, successive versions of the DSM referred to transsexualism as a
subtype of gender identity disorder applicable to adults and adolescents, until 1994, when transsexualism was
removed from the DSM). Because the now obsolete diagnosis of transsexualism merely referred to gender identity
disorder in adolescents and adults, the ADA’s exclusion of transsexualism does not apply to gender dysphoria for
the very same reasons that the ADA’s exclusion of gender identity disorders does not apply to gender dysphoria. See
infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text (discussing ADA’s coverage of gender dysphoria).
80
In two separate cases, Wal-Mart and the University of Georgia have rightly acknowledged that the ADA
does not exclude gender dysphoria. See Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Part’l Mot. Dismiss, Musgrove v. Bd. of Regents et
al., No. 3:18-CV-00080, at 2-3 (M.D. Ga. 2018); Defs.’ Br. Supp. Part’l Mot. Dismiss, Bost v. Sam’s East, No.
1:17-cv-1148, at 2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2018).
81
See Iglesias v. True, 2019 WL 3340652, at *4 (S.D. Ill. 2019) (concluding, on preliminary review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that “the Court cannot categorically say that gender dysphoria falls within the [Rehabilitation
Act’s] exclusionary language and will err on the side of caution to allow Plaintiff’s claim to proceed.”); Edmo v.
Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 2745898, at *8 (D. Idaho June 7, 2018) (“[T]he issue of
whether Edmo’s diagnosis falls under a specific exclusion of the ADA presents a genuine dispute of material fact in
this case. Therefore, Edmo’s ADA claim will not be dismissed.”); Doe v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., No. 1712255, 2018 WL 2994403, at *7 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on “a
dispute of fact as to whether Doe’s [gender dysphoria] falls outside the ADA’s exclusion of gender identity-based
disorders as they were understood by Congress twenty-eight years ago.”); Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017) (holding that gender dysphoria “is not excluded by §
12211 of the ADA, and Cabela’s motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claims on this basis is denied”).
82
See DOJ Blatt Stat. of Int., supra note 26, at 5-6; Stat. of Int. of U.S. at 2-3, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-CV1934 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 57; Stat. of Int. of U.S. at 2, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640 (D.N.J. July
17, 2017), ECF No. 49.
83
Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *6.
84
See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451-53.
85
See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Gender Dysphoria 2 (2013),
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf
(stating that gender identity disorder connoted “that the patient is ‘disordered’”).
86
See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (“The current term is more descriptive than the previous DSM-IV term
gender identity disorder and focuses on dysphoria as the clinical problem, not identity per se.”); compare id. at 814
79
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criteria for gender dysphoria in the DSM-5 are different than those for gender identity disorder.87
Indeed, there are people with gender dysphoria—namely, those who have “undergone at least
one medical procedure or treatment to support the new gender assignment”—that would not
meet the criteria for gender identity disorder.88 Furthermore, unlike the DSM’s treatment of
gender identity disorders, the DSM-5 includes a new section entitled “Genetics and Physiology,”
which discusses the possible genetic and physiological underpinnings of gender dysphoria. 89
2.

The ADA Excludes Transgender Identity, Not Medical Conditions Associated with
Transgender People

Alternatively, gender dysphoria is not excluded under the ADA because it is not a “gender
identity disorder” as that term was understood by Congress approximately thirty years ago.90 As
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail,
Inc., “gender identity disorder” in the ADA refers simply to transgender identity, i.e., “the
condition of identifying with a different gender”—not to medical conditions like gender
dysphoria that transgender people may have. 91 Like being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, the court
reasoned, being transgender is, by itself, not a medical condition and therefore is excluded under
the ADA.92 Gender dysphoria, by contrast, is a medical condition,93 and therefore is not excluded
under the ADA. 94
(stating that DSM-5 “emphasiz[es] the phenomenon of ‘gender incongruence’ rather than cross-gender identification
per se, as was the case in DSM-IV gender identity disorder”), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) (characterizing “gender identity disorder” as
involving a “strong and persistent cross-gender identification” and a “persistent discomfort” with one’s sex or
“sense of inappropriateness” in the gender role of that sex) (emphasis added).
87
See Doe v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403, at *7 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018)
(“In contrast to DSM-IV, which had defined ‘gender identity disorder’ as characterized by a ‘strong and persistent
cross gender-identification’ and a ‘persistent discomfort’ with one’s sex or ‘sense of inappropriateness’ in a given
gender role, the diagnosis of GD in DSM-V requires attendant disabling physical symptoms, in addition to
manifestations of clinically significant emotional distress.”); see also id. (expressing agreement with plaintiff’s
argument that “the decision to treat ‘Gender Dysphoria’ in DSM-V as a freestanding diagnosis is more than a
semantic refinement. Rather, it reflects an evolving re-evaluation by the medical community of transgender issues
and the recognition that GD involves far more than a person’s gender identification.”).
88
See, e.g., DSM-5, supra note 13, at 815 (adding a “posttransition specifier to identify individuals who have
undergone at least one medical procedure or treatment to support the new gender assignment (e.g., cross-sex
hormone treatment). Although the concept of posttransition is modeled on the concept of full or partial remission,
the term remission has implications in terms of symptom reduction that do not apply directly to gender dysphoria.”).
89
See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457; see also infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing physical
etiology of gender dysphoria).
90
See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2018).
91
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017); id. at
*3 (“exclud[ing] certain sexual identities from the ADA’s definition of disability”—not the medical conditions “that
persons of those identities might have”) (emphasis added).
92
See id. at *3 n.3 (likening “gender identity disorder” to “homosexual[ity] or bisexual[ity],” none of which are
medical conditions covered by the ADA); see also Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and a
New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 373, 385 (2017) (discussing Blatt’s holding).
93
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why gender dysphoria is a physical
impairment and/or mental impairment under the ADA).
94
Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 (concluding that “a condition like Blatt’s gender dysphoria goes beyond
merely identifying with a different gender and is characterized by clinically significant stress and other
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3.

Gender Dysphoria Falls within the ADA’s Safe Harbor

Even allowing, arguendo, that gender dysphoria is somehow a “gender identity disorder”
within the meaning of the ADA, it is not excluded because it falls within the ADA’s safe harbor
for gender identity disorders that “result[] from [a] physical impairment[].”95 The burgeoning
medical research underlying gender dysphoria points to a physical etiology—namely, an atypical
interaction of sex hormones with the developing brain that results in a person being born with
circulating hormones inconsistent with the person’s brain sex. 96 This atypical interaction of sex
hormones with the developing brain is a “physiological . . . condition . . . affecting one or more
body systems,” including “neurological . . . [and] endocrine” systems. 97 As the U.S. Department
of Justice opined in Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., and reaffirmed in two subsequent cases,
“current research increasingly indicates that gender dysphoria has physiological or biological
roots” and, therefore, the ADA’s exclusion of gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments “should be construed narrowly such that gender dysphoria falls outside its
scope.”98 In rejecting the argument that gender dysphoria is excluded under the ADA, the
District Court of Massachusetts similarly observed that “[w]hile medical research in this area
remains in its initial phases,” recent studies suggest that gender dysphoria diagnoses may “have a
physical etiology, namely hormonal and genetic drivers contributing to the in-utero development
of dysphoria.”99

impairments”). But see Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 744, 754-755 (S.D. Ohio 2018)
(erroneously equating gender dysphoria with “gender identity disorders,” and ignoring Blatt’s conclusion that
gender dysphoria refers to a medical condition that is not excluded from the ADA, whereas “gender identity
disorders”—as used in the ADA—refer to transgender identity, which is excluded from the ADA).
95
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2018); see Doe v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403,
at *6 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (“Doe has raised a dispute of fact that her GD may result from physical causes.”).
Notably, in Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc., in which the court erroneously concluded that gender dysphoria was
not protected by the ADA, the plaintiff failed to allege that gender dysphoria results from a physical impairment.
307 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (“It was . . . Parker’s obligation to allege in her Amended Complaint that her gender
dysphoria is caused by a physical impairment. Having failed to do so, her disability claims under the ADA and [state
law] are foreclosed.”).
96
See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *6 (noting “recent studies demonstrating that GD
diagnoses have a physical etiology, namely hormonal and genetic drivers contributing to the in utero development of
dysphoria”); DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457 (discussing genetic and hormonal contributions to gender dysphoria);
Duffy, supra note 26, at 16-72 to 16-74 & n.282 (citing numerous medical studies that “point in the direction of
hormonal and genetic causes for the in utero development of gender dysphoria”); DOJ Blatt Stat. of Int., supra note
26, at 5 (“While no clear scientific consensus appears to exist regarding the specific origins of gender dysphoria
(i.e., whether it can be traced to neurological, genetic, or hormonal sources), the current research increasingly
indicates that gender dysphoria has physiological or biological roots.”).
97
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2019); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.105(b)(1)(i) (2019).
98
DOJ Blatt Stat. of Int., supra note 26, at 4-5; see also Stat. of Int. of U.S. at 2-3, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16CV-1934 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 57; Stat. of Int. of U.S. at 2-3, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640
(D.N.J. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 49.
99
See Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *7 (“[T]he continuing re-evaluation of GD underway in the
relevant sectors of the medical community is sufficient, for present purposes, to raise a dispute of fact as to whether
Doe’s GD falls outside the ADA’s exclusion of gender identity-based disorders as they were understood by
Congress twenty-eight years ago.”); see also Duffy, supra note 26, at 16-52, 16-76 (noting similarities between
gender dysphoria and physical conditions with complex etiologies not fully understood by the medical community
that are nevertheless protected by the ADA, including polycystic ovary syndrome, cerebral palsy, strabismus,
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4.

The Exclusion of Gender Dysphoria Would Contradict the ADA’s Remedial Purpose, as
Clarified by the ADAAA and its Implementing Regulations

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “the remedial nature of the ADA and the
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions directing that the terms ‘disability’ and ‘physical
impairment’ be read broadly” strongly support the inclusion of gender dysphoria. 100 Indeed, a
contrary interpretation would contradict the primary purpose of the ADAAA, which is to clarify
that “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether
covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred,
not whether the individual meets the definition of disability.” 101 Under the ADA, as amended,
“[T]he question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not
demand extensive analysis.” 102
5.

The ADA’s Exclusion of Gender Dysphoria Would Violate Equal Protection

Lastly, interpreting the ADA to discriminate facially against people with gender dysphoria
would give rise to “a serious doubt of constitutionality” under the Equal Protection Clause and
must therefore be avoided under the well-settled doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 103
Specifically, by excluding a medical condition that is closely associated with transgender people
(indeed, only transgender people have gender dysphoria), 104 the exclusion would constitute a
dyslexia, microvascular angina, stuttering, and Tourette syndrome—the latter two of which were once believed to be
purely mental conditions).
100
DOJ Blatt Stat. of Int., supra note 26, at 5; compare Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)
(discussing “familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes”), City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (“[A]n exception to ‘a
general statement of policy’ is sensibly read ‘narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy].’”)
(quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)), Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Se. Pennsylvania
Transp. Authority, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The ADA is a remedial statute, designed to eliminate
discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society, and as such, it must be broadly construed to effectuate its
purposes.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted), Hason v. Medical Bd. of California, 279 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Courts must construe the language of the ADA broadly in order to effectively implement the ADA’s
fundamental purpose of “provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”), and Richards v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 579 F.2d 830, 833
(3d Cir. 1978) (“Remedial legislation is traditionally construed broadly, with exceptions construed narrowly.”), with
supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing statutory and regulatory provisions directing that ADA’s
definition of disability be construed broadly).
101
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2019); 28 C.F.R. § 36.101(b) (2019); accord ADAAA, supra note 66, at §
2(b)(5).
102
ADAAA, supra note 66, at § 2(b)(5); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B) (2018) (“The term ‘substantially
limits’ shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”).
103
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *5–6 (D.
Mass. June. 14, 2018) (“[A] court has a duty where ‘a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised’ with respect to a
statutory provision to ‘first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which [a
constitutional] question may be avoided.’”) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); see also United
States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A]s between two plausible constructions of a statute, an
inquiring court should avoid a constitutionally suspect one in favor of a constitutionally uncontroversial
alternative.”).
104
See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (“Transgender refers to the broad spectrum of individuals who transiently
or persistently identify with a gender different from their [assigned] gender. . . . Gender dysphoria refers to the
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transgender classification that fails heightened scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored or
substantially related to the achievement of a compelling or important governmental interest.105 If
heightened scrutiny does not apply, the ADA exclusion fails even the most minimal level of
scrutiny because it is rooted in moral animus against transgender people, 106 and such “a bare
distress that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned
gender.”); cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 689 (2010) (“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct
that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than
conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
105
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 552-54, 687-88 (5th
ed. 2015) (discussing levels of judicial scrutiny). There are two theories under which courts have applied heightened
scrutiny to transgender classifications. Under the first theory, courts have held that heightened scrutiny is warranted
because transgender people satisfy the criteria of a suspect/quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749 (E.D. Va. 2018) (applying “heightened scrutiny” because “transgender
individuals constitute at least a quasi-suspect class”); accord Flack v. Wis. Dept. of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d
931, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2018); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719 (D. Md.
2018); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208-09
(D.D.C. 2017), vacated by Doe 2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, 2019 WL 102309 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2019); Evancho v.
Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d at 288; Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United States
Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139–40; cf. Fabian v. Hosp.
of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016) (citing Adkins for proposition that “transgender
people are a ‘quasi-suspect’ class and therefore . . . disparate treatment alleged to violate the Equal Protection Clause
is subject to the elevated ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard”).
Under the second theory, courts have held that heightened scrutiny is warranted because discrimination
based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination—either because it reflects sex stereotypes, or because the
root of the discrimination is based on a person’s change of sex or assigned sex at birth. See, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d
at 1051 (applying “heightened review” because school district’s bathroom policy, which required transgender
students to use the bathroom consistent the sex listed on their birth certificates, was “inherently based upon a sexclassification”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of transgender employee because “discriminating against someone on the basis of his or
her gender non-conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” and is therefore
“subject to heightened scrutiny”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
transgender employee’s “claims of gender discrimination . . . easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause”); Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *9 (holding that
housing transgender inmates in facilities that correspond to their birth sex was discrimination “based on sex and is
therefore subject to heightened judicial scrutiny above the normal ‘rational basis’ test”); Stockman v. Trump, 331 F.
Supp. 3d 990, 1002 (2018) (applying “intermediate scrutiny”); Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 209-210 (applying
“intermediate level of scrutiny” because transgender discrimination is “a form of discrimination on the basis of
gender, which is itself subject to intermediate scrutiny”); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (“[D]iscrimination against transgender individuals is a form of gender-based discrimination subject to
intermediate scrutiny.”).
106
The ADA’s legislative history reveals that the ADA’s exclusion of “gender identity disorders” was based on
the moral opprobrium of two senior senators, conveyed in the eleventh hour of a marathon day-long floor debate,
who erroneously believed that gender identity disorders were “sexual behavior disorders” undeserving of legal
protection. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10753, available at 1989 WL 183115 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (“I could not
imagine the [ADA] sponsors would want to provide a protected legal status to somebody who has such [mental]
disorders, particularly those [that] might have a moral content.”) (statement of Sen. Armstrong); id. at S10768,
available at 1989 WL 183216 (“If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair or those who have been injured
in the war, that is one thing. But how in the world did you get to the place that you did not even [ex]clude
transvestites? What I get out of all of this is here comes the U.S. Government telling the employer that he cannot set
up any moral standards for his business . . . . [H]e cannot say, look I feel very strongly about people who engage in
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[congressional] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”107 As the District of Massachusetts has concluded, the ADA’s exclusion
of gender dysphoria would be “constitutionally suspect,” particularly given “the pairing of
gender identity disorders with conduct that is criminal or viewed by society as immoral or lewd,”
which raises “a serious question as to the light in which the drafters of this exclusion viewed
transgender persons.”108
B.

Transition-Related Care Exclusions Constitute Discrimination Based on Gender Dysphoria

A person may prove discrimination under the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 in one of
three ways: “[(i)]intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); . . . [(ii)] disparate impact; and
. . . [(iii)] failure to make a reasonable accommodation.”109 The exclusion of transition-related
sexually deviant behavior or unlawful sexual practices.”) (statement of Sen. Helms); id. at S10796 (“In short, we are
talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and which individuals are engaging in of their own
volition, admittedly for reasons we do not fully understand.”) (statement of Sen. Rudman); id. at S11175, available
at 1989 WL 183785 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989) (advocating exclusion of “sexual behavior disorders: Transvestism
and Transsexualism”) (supplemental statement of Sen. Armstrong); see also Pl.’s Mem. Law in Opp’n, Blatt v.
Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2015 WL 1360179 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2015) (“[T]o argue that moral
animus was not the primary motivation for excluding the subset of mental impairments that these Senators viewed as
morally problematic runs contrary to the words explicitly spoken on the Senate Floor on September 7, 1989.”);
Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 507, 574 (2016) (“Senators Armstrong, Helms, and Rudman repeatedly invoked immorality as the justification
for the transgender exclusions, decrying the ADA’s coverage of ‘sexually deviant behavior.’”); accord Duffy, supra
note 26, at 16-38 to 16-39 (compiling ADA’s legislative history); Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 36-38, 42-44, 50 (2004) (same).
107
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446
(1985) (“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”).
108
See Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403, at *7 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (citing,
inter alia, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see also id. at *8 (“It is virtually
impossible to square the exclusion of otherwise bona fide disabilities [like gender dysphoria] with the remedial
purpose of the ADA, which is to redress discrimination against individuals with disabilities based on antiquated or
prejudicial conceptions of how they came to their station in life.”).
109
Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009); see, e.g., Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136,
144-45 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[W]e need make no distinction between the [ADA and Section 504] for purposes of our
analysis in this case. . . . A plaintiff can press several different types of claims of disability discrimination. First, a
plaintiff can assert disparate treatment on account of disability, i.e., that the disability actually motivated the
defendant's challenged adverse conduct. . . . Alternatively, in an appropriate case a plaintiff can claim that a
government policy, though neutral on its face, fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity. Finally, a plaintiff can pursue a third path, claiming that a public entity has refused to
affirmatively accommodate his or her disability where such accommodation was needed to provide meaningful
access to a public service.”) (citations omitted); Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316 n. 3 (11th Cir.
2009) (stating that the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are governed by “the same standards” and therefore may be
used “interchangeably”); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In view
of the similarities between the relevant provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and their implementing
regulations, courts construe and apply them in a consistent manner.”); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
274-76 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing three theories of discrimination available under ADA and Section 504); Mass.
Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *8 (“Because Doe has adequately stated a claim under the ADA, it follows
that her Rehabilitation Act claim is equally viable.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5) (2018) (finding that “individuals
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
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care constitutes discrimination based on gender dysphoria in violation of the ADA (Titles I and
III), Section 504, and Section 1557 under each of these three theories.
1.

Title 1 of the ADA

Title I of the ADA prohibits covered entities from discriminating on the basis of disability in
regard to, among other things, “employee compensation . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment”110 Such discrimination includes intentional discrimination, such as:
“limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee”; and participating in a contractual
relationship with another entity—such as “an organization providing fringe benefits to an
employee”—that “has the effect of” discriminating against an applicant or employee. 111
Health insurance plans that exclude transition-related care intentionally discriminate based on
gender dysphoria in two ways.112 First, broadly speaking, these plans purposefully deny coverage
for medically necessary treatment of gender dysphoria (e.g., hormone therapy and surgery) while
covering medically necessary treatment of other disabilities. For example, an insurance policy
that denies people with gender dysphoria insurance coverage for hormone therapy and surgery,
while covering the cost of medically necessary drugs and surgery for people with heart disease,
discriminates based on gender dysphoria. 113 Those with gender dysphoria and those with heart
disease both have disabilities in need of medically necessary treatment, but insurance covers the
medically necessary treatment of heart disease only—not gender dysphoria.
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria,
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities”); ADAAA,
supra note 66, at § 2(a)(2) (finding that “people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from
[fully participating in all aspects of society] . . . because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove
societal and institutional barriers”).
Because Section 1557 explicitly references Section 504’s anti-discrimination mandate, it necessarily
incorporates the three theories of discrimination available under the ADA and Section 504. See infra notes 152-54
(discussing Section 1557’s incorporation of Section 504’s antidiscrimination mandate and enforcement
mechanisms).
110
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2019) (prohibiting discrimination “in regard to . . .
[f]ringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the covered entity”).
111
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(2) (2018); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019) (“Disparate treatment means,
with respect to title I of the ADA, that an individual was treated differently on the basis of his or her disability.”).
The ADA’s prohibition of intentional discrimination also includes associational discrimination, that is, “excluding or
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual
with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(4) (2018);
accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (2019).
112
A plaintiff may demonstrate disparate treatment under the ADA through direct or circumstantial evidence,
the latter of which courts analyze under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Grant v. Hosp. Auth. of Miller Cnty., No. 1:15-CV-201-LJA, 2017 WL 3527703, at *4
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2017) (“Where . . . a plaintiff presents no direct evidence of discrimination, she may present
circumstantial evidence of discrimination . . . .”). The deliberate exclusion of medically necessary treatments for
gender dysphoria constitutes direct evidence of disparate treatment or, alternatively, circumstantial evidence of
disparate treatment that is without a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis.
113
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b) (2018).
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Second, and more specifically, these exclusions purposefully deny coverage for certain
medically necessary procedures used to treat gender dysphoria (e.g., hormone therapy and
surgeries such as mastectomy, hysterectomy, phalloplasty, and vaginoplasty) while covering the
same procedures when they are used to treat other disabilities. For example, an insurance policy
that denies people with gender dysphoria coverage for hormone therapy and mastectomies, while
covering the cost of hormone therapy and mastectomies for people with cancer, discriminates
based on gender dysphoria. 114 Those with gender dysphoria and those with cancer both have
disabilities in need of the very same medically necessary procedures, but insurance covers these
procedures for cancer only—not gender dysphoria.
Longstanding EEOC interpretive guidance is clear on this point:
[A]n employer or other covered entity cannot deny an individual with a disability
who is qualified equal access to insurance or subject an individual with a disability
who is qualified to different terms or conditions of insurance based on disability
alone, if the disability does not pose increased risks. 115
Although “it would be permissible for an employer to offer an insurance policy that limits
coverage for certain procedures or treatments” to all employees, an employer’s limitation of
coverage for certain employees with disabilities violates Title I.116 For example, according to the
EEOC, “it would not be permissible to limit or deny [a] hemophiliac employee”—and no
others—coverage for “procedures . . . such as heart surgery or the setting of a broken leg.”117
This is precisely what transition-related care exclusions do: they limit coverage for certain
procedures for people with gender dysphoria, while covering the same procedures for those with
other medical conditions.
Title I of the ADA also prohibits covered entities from engaging in conduct that, while not
intentionally discriminatory, has a disparate impact on people with disabilities. 118 Such
discrimination includes the use of “standards, criteria, or methods of administration . . . that have
the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability.” 119 Insurance policies that exclude
transition-related care have the effect of discriminating against people with gender dysphoria
114

See id.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019).
116
Id.; see also id. (“[A]n employer that reduces the number of paid sick leave days that it will provide to all
employees, or reduces the amount of medical insurance coverage that it will provide to all employees, is not in
violation of this part, even if the benefits reduction has an impact on employees with disabilities in need of greater
sick leave and medical coverage.”) (emphasis added).
117
Id.
118
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (2018); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019) (“Disparate impact means,
with respect to title I of the ADA and this part, that uniformly applied criteria have an adverse impact on an
individual with a disability or a disproportionately negative impact on a class of individuals with disabilities.”).
Unlike Title VII, a plaintiff may demonstrate disparate treatment under the ADA “by demonstrating an adverse
impact on himself rather than on an entire group.” Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, Tex., 176 F.3d 834, 839 n.26
(5th Cir. 1999).
119
42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(3) (2018) (emphasis added); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (2019).
115

116

because such people receive lesser benefits than their co-workers for no reason other than
disability. 120
Lastly, and critically, Title I of the ADA prohibits a covered entity from failing to “mak[e]
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations” of a person with a
disability, 121 unless the covered entity “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship” on the covered entity’s business. 122 Showing undue hardship is an
affirmative defense. 123 An accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” when it “require[es]
significant difficulty or expense,” as determined by reference to, inter alia, “the nature and cost
of the accommodation needed” and “the overall financial resources of the covered entity.” 124 To
facilitate the provision of reasonable accommodations in the workplace, Title I’s implementing
regulations require an employer to engage in an “interactive process” with the employee to
“identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 125
A covered entity’s refusal to offer insurance policies that cover transition-related care
constitutes a failure to make reasonable accommodations. 126 Specifically, the request to remove
an exclusion for transition-related care is reasonable because it seeks a benefit that all other
employees enjoy: coverage for medically necessary care. Furthermore, accommodation imposes
little or no cost on the employer—especially larger employers. This point is worth emphasizing.
Because transgender people comprise a small percentage of the U.S. population (0.6%),127 and
because not all transgender people undergo all available treatments, multiple studies show that
the cost of covering transition-related care is inconsequential or cost-neutral. 128 Some studies
120

See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(3) (2018).
See id. § 12111(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)-(b) (2019). Title I also prohibits an employer from
“denying employment opportunities” to a person with a disability because of the need to make such a reasonable
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(5) (2018).
122
42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(5) (2018). Once the plaintiff establishes a failure to accommodate, the burden of
production shifts to the employer to demonstrate undue hardship. Grant v. Hosp. Auth. of Miller Cnty, No. 1:15-CV201-LJA, 2017 WL 3527703, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2017). “[T]he plaintiff has no subsequent burden to
demonstrate pretext.” Id.
123
See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019) (“An employer or other covered entity alleged to have
discriminated because it did not make a reasonable accommodation . . . may offer as a defense that it would have
been an undue hardship to make the accommodation.”). .
124
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2018).
125
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2019).
126
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2018).
127
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
128
See, e.g., Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1021-22 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (stating
that analyses of transition-related health care exclusion in state Medicaid plan “reveal such small estimated savings .
. . that they are both practically and actuarially immaterial. Defendants estimate that removing the [exclusion] and
covering gender-confirming surgeries would cost between $300,000 and $1.2 million annually, which actuarially
speaking amounts to one hundredth to three hundredth of one percent of the State’s share of Wisconsin Medicaid’s
annual budget.”); Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 1000-01 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (“From an actuarial
perspective, there appears to be no dispute that the cost of coverage is immaterial at 0.1% to 0.2% of the total cost of
providing health insurance to state employees, even adopting defendants’ cost estimation. . . . [T]he court is hardpressed to find that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the cost justification was an ‘exceedingly persuasive’
reason or that this miniscule cost savings would further ‘important governmental objectives.’”); HRC CEI, supra
121
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suggest that coverage for transition-related care reduces costs, given the substantial costs that
may result from untreated gender dysphoria, including costs arising from the “development of
depression, anxiety, and substance abuse,” and suicide attempts. 129 If the cost of healthcare were
of genuine concern, it is difficult to see why an employer would not target for exclusion the
treatment of far more prevalent and expensive medical conditions, such as cancer. In addition,
the overwhelming number of private businesses (752) that report removing transition-related
care exclusions from their health insurance plans, together with the twenty states and the District
of Columbia that prohibit transition-related care exclusions under state insurance law,
substantially undermines the claim that coverage of transition-related care is not financially
viable. 130
Numerous cases support the conclusion that transition-related care exclusions
constitute discrimination based on disability under Title I.131
note 53, at 14 (“According to businesses’ reporting to the HRC Foundation, making [transition-related care] . . .
accessible comes at an overall negligible cost to the employers’ overall health insurance plans. This holds true
across industries.”); Jody L. Herman, Costs and Benefits of Providing Transition-Related Health Care Coverage in
Employee Health Benefit Plans: Findings from a Survey of Employers, at 2 (2013), available at:
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Cost-Benefit-of-Trans-Health-Benefits-Sept2013.pdf (“Employers report very low costs, if any, from adding transition-related coverage to their health benefits
plans or from actual utilization of the benefit after it has been added—with many employers reporting no costs at
all.”); William V. Padula et al., Societal Implications of Health Insurance Coverage for Medically Necessary
Services in the U.S. Transgender Population: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 31 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 394
(2015), http://www.tgender.net/taw/SanFranciscoTGBenefitUpdateMar3106.pdf (discussing experience of City and
County of San Francisco, which “remov[ed] transgender access exclusions in its employee health plans” in 2001 and
reported that, after five years, “the benefit has proven to be appropriately accessed and undeniably more affordable
than other, often routinely covered, procedures. . . . Unlike the fears expressed, none of the concerns came to pass. . .
. [T]he benefit costs much less to provide than the reduced rate currently being charged.”); accord Cal. Dep’t of Ins.,
Economic Impact Assessment: Gender Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance (2012),
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Economic-Impact-Assessment-GenderNondiscrimination-In-Health-Insurance.pdf; Wis. Dep’t of Emp. Trust Funds, Correspondence Memorandum (Aug.
14, 2018), http://etf.wi.gov/boards/agenda-items-2018/gib0822/item6a1.pdf; Wis. Dep’t of Emp. Trust Funds,
Correspondence Memorandum (Jan. 30, 2017), http://etf.wi.gov/boards/agenda-items-2017/gib0208/item4.pdf.
129
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 454-55; see also Cal. Dep’t of Ins., supra note 128, at 9 (“The evidence suggests
that there may be potential cost savings resulting from the adoption of the proposed regulation [that prohibits the
denial of coverage for transition-related care] in the medium to long term, such as lower costs associated with the
high cost of suicide and attempts at suicide, overall improvements in mental health and lower rates of substance
abuse . . . .”).
130
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing coverage for transition-related care in private
sector and under state law).
131
See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 14-15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that caps on AIDS-related care in employer-provided health plan could
constitute discrimination under Title I of ADA); see also Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960
(8th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f the evidence shows that a given treatment is non-experimental—that is, if it is widespread,
safe, and a significant improvement on traditional therapies—and the plan provides the treatment for other
conditions directly comparable to the one at issue, the denial of that treatment arguably violates the ADA.”); Brown
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 5 F. Supp. 3d 121, 136-37 (D. Me. 2014) (holding that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to
show that an employee benefits administrator discriminated against employee in violation of Title I of the ADA by
denying leave of absence and failing to accommodate plaintiff); Fletcher v. Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104,
114 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer violated Title I of the ADA by adopting and
maintaining a health plan that provided inferior benefits to people with mental health conditions); Iwata v. Intel
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Some covered entities offer transition-related care in only one insurance plan but not in
others.132 This is not a “reasonable” accommodation for two reasons. First, the provision of only
one transition-inclusive plan effectively relegates people with gender dysphoria to that single
plan. This deprives these employees of an opportunity that all other employees enjoy, namely,
the ability to choose a plan. 133 Second, by effectively mandating the insurance plan that people
with gender dysphoria must use, the network of providers they must see, and the premiums they
must pay, the provision of a single transition-inclusive plan stigmatizes people with gender
dysphoria, branding them as financial liabilities undeserving of equal benefits. 134
2.

Title III of the ADA

Title III of the ADA prohibits any person who operates a place of public accommodation
from discriminating on the basis of disability in regard to, among other things, “the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations”
provided by the public accommodation. 135 Like Title I, Title III prohibits intentional
discrimination, such as—“directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements”—(i)
denying an individual the opportunity “to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity” on the basis of disability, (ii)
affording an individual the opportunity “to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility,
privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals,” or

Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 155 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer and third party
administrator violated Title I of ADA by providing inferior disability benefits to people with mental health
conditions); E.E.O.C. v. Benicorp Ins. Co., No. IP 00-014-MISC, 2000 WL 724004, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2000)
(rejecting argument that third party administrator of health plan that excluded cochlear implant surgery was not an
“employer” under Title I of the ADA); Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D.N.H. 1999)
(holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer violated Title I of the ADA by adopting and maintaining a health
plan that provided inferior benefits to people with mental health conditions); Morgenthal ex rel. Morgenthal v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6443, 1999 WL 187055, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999)
(holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer violated Title I of the ADA by providing a health plan that
excluded coverage for treatment of “all developmental disorders”); Esfahani v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 919 F. Supp. 832,
836, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer violated ADA by providing inferior
health insurance benefits to people with mental health conditions); Petty v. El Dorado Eng’g, Inc., No. Civ. A. 943203, Civ. A. 95-3812, 1996 WL 191749, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 1996) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that
third party administrator discriminated against employee in violation of Title I of the ADA by denying long term
disability benefits); infra note 162 (collecting cases applying Title I of ADA to third party administrators).
132
Musgrove Compl. ¶¶ 57, 60, supra note 12 (alleging that, of the four health plans offered by the University
of Georgia to its employees, only one plan—which was over twice as expensive as the other three and had a far
more limited selection of surgeons—covered treatments for gender dysphoria).
133
See 42 U.S.C. 12111(b)(1) (2018) (prohibiting “limiting, segregating, or classifying” an employee based on
disability).
134
See Musgrove Compl. ¶59, supra note 12 (“Contracting with one third-party HMO that does not
discriminate in its plan while the Board persists in excluding medically necessary care does not address the inequity
in plan choices, plan coverage, or the stigma caused by having exclusions at all. The simple existence of ‘sex
change’ exclusions—which lack a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis—devalues the medical needs of [the plaintiff]
and all employees with gender dysphoria . . . .”).
135
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2018).
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(iii) providing an individual “with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals.” 136
A transition-related care exclusion intentionally discriminates by denying people with gender
dysphoria the “full and equal enjoyment” of health care benefits. 137 Specifically, by purposefully
refusing to cover medically necessary procedures used to treat gender dysphoria (e.g., hormone
therapy and surgery) while covering the same medically necessary procedures when they are
used to treat other disabilities, the exclusion provides people with gender dysphoria with a
service that is “different or separate from that provided to other individuals,” and plainly
unequal. 138
Title III also prohibits conduct that has a disparate impact on people with disabilities. This
includes (i) “directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, utiliz[ing]
standards or criteria or methods of administration . . . that have the effect of discriminating on the
basis of disability”; or (ii) imposing “eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally
enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such
criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered.” 139 The exclusion of transition-related
care has a disparate impact: its effect is to discriminate on the basis of disability by utilizing
“methods of administration” to provide lesser benefits to people with gender dysphoria. 140 It also
“screen[s] out” people with gender dysphoria by rendering them alone ineligible for coverage for
medically necessary treatments.141
Additionally, Title III requires making “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 142 The exclusion of transitionrelated care constitutes a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures” necessary to afford equal benefits to people with gender dysphoria. 143 Just as these
accommodations impose no “undue hardship” under Title I, they also do not “fundamentally
Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A). Title III’s prohibition on intentional discrimination also includes associational
discrimination. See id. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (prohibiting a covered entity from “exclud[ing] or otherwise deny[ing]
equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to an individual or
entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a
relationship or association”).
137
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2018).
138
See id. at § 12182(b)(1)(iii).
139
Id. § 12182(b)(1)(D), (b)(2)(A)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C (2019) (stating that Title III
“incorporate[s] a disparate impact standard to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative mandate to end
discrimination. This standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).”).
140
Id. § 12182(b)(1)(D).
141
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
142
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
143
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2018).
136
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alter the nature” of the services provided by insurers. 144 The cost of including transition-related
care is negligible or even non-existent, as demonstrated by numerous studies, the nearly 800
private businesses that reported covering such care in 2019, and the twenty-one jurisdictions that
prohibit transition-related care exclusions under state insurance law. 145
Numerous cases support the conclusion that transition-related care exclusions constitute
discrimination based on disability under Title III.146
3.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) prohibits recipients of federal financial
assistance from “exclud[ing]” or “deny[ing] . . . benefits” to a person, or otherwise “subject[ing]”
a person to discrimination, based on disability. 147 As the Supreme Court and numerous lower
See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (“While Title I
provides an undue hardship defense and Title III provides a fundamental alteration defense, fundamental alteration
is merely a particular type of undue hardship.”); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019) (“‘Undue hardship’ refers
to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would
fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.”).
145
See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing inconsequential costs of covering transitionrelated care).
146
See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 1921 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing district court’s dismissal of action and holding that entities that administered employersponsored health insurance plan could be liable under Title III of ADA for imposing caps on AIDS-related care);
Fletcher v. Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 115 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that third party
administrator violated Title III of the ADA by providing inferior benefits to people with mental health conditions);
Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214-16 (D.N.H. 1999) (same); Attar v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
America, No. CA 3-96-CV-367-R, 1998 WL 574885, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998) (denying summary judgment
to third party administrator and holding that “24–month limitation on [coverage for] mental disabilities strikes the
Court as a rather overt ‘limit’ on the ‘extent’ of ‘coverage’ under the benefit plan” and “would thus be subject to an
ADA [Title III] claim, unless of course it could be justified by actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated
experience”); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (Title III applicable to third
party administrator’s provision of inferior benefits to people with mental health conditions); see also Pallozzi v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1999) (vacating district court’s motion to dismiss and holding that
plaintiff stated claim that insurer violated Title III of ADA by refusing to offer life insurance policy to people with
mental health conditions); accord Reid v. BCBSM, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955, 957 (D. Minn. 2013) (Title III
applicable to health insurer’s exclusion of behavioral therapy treatment for people with Autism Spectrum Disorder);
Wai v. Allstate, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (Title III of ADA applicable to insurer’s provision of landlords’
insurance at less favorable rates and terms to landlords who rent to tenants with disabilities); Winslow v. IDS Life
Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562-63 (D. Minn. 1998) (Title III of ADA applicable to insurer’s provision of inferior
benefits to people with mental health conditions); Dunlap v. Association of Bay Area Governments, 996 F. Supp.
962, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (Title III of ADA applicable to insurer’s denial of coverage for, inter alia, recommended
surgical procedure); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 964 F. Supp. 299, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (Title III
applicable to insurer’s denial of life insurance to plaintiff based on partner’s HIV-status); Kotev v. First Colony Life
Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1320-23 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp.
422, 425 (D.N.H. 1996) (Title III applicable to insurer’s denial of mortgage disability insurance to person with
mental health condition); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28,
1995) (Title III applicable to insurer’s denial of health insurance to person with history of seizure disorder); infra
note 171 (collecting cases applying Title III of ADA to insurers and third party administrators).
147
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018); accord 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a) (2019) (DOJ regulations); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a)
(2019) (DHHS regulations).
144
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courts have held, Section 504, like the ADA, prohibits intentional discrimination, disparate
impact, and the failure to make reasonable accommodations. 148 Section 504’s implementing
regulations, upon which the ADA is based, 149 confirm as much.150 Accordingly, transitionrelated care exclusions violate Section 504 for the same reasons that they violate the ADA. 151
4.

Section 1557 of the ACA

Section 1557 of the ACA prohibits a health program or activity from discriminating “on the
ground prohibited under . . . Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,” that is, based on
disability. 152 Because Section 1557 explicitly incorporates Section 504’s anti-discrimination
mandate and enforcement mechanisms, the requirements for showing discrimination under

See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299, 301 (1985) (“assum[ing] without deciding that § 504
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped,” and stating that “to
assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit may have to be made
[under Section 504]”); supra note 109 (collecting lower court cases applying identical antidiscrimination analysis
under ADA and Section 504); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2018) (prohibiting courts from construing ADA “to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under [Section 504] . . . of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title”).
149
See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127 (stating that the ADA “hewed . . .
closely . . . to the language and structure of the Section 504 regulations[,] . . . diverg[ing] from those regulations in
only a few, select circumstances”).
150
See, e.g., Alexander, 469 U.S. 287, 301 n.21 (citing DHHS regulations for proposition that “[t]he regulations
implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that reasonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered
must at times be made to assure meaningful access.”); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1) (2019) (prohibiting disparate treatment
on the basis of disability, including, “directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements”: (i)
“[d]eny[ing] a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or
service”; (ii) “[a]fford[ing] a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid,
benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others”; (iii) “[p]rovid[ing] a qualified handicapped person with
an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective as that provided to others”; (iv) “[p]rovid[ing] different or separate
aid, benefits, or services to handicapped persons or to any class of handicapped persons unless such action is
necessary to provide qualified handicapped persons with aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those
provided to others”; or (v) “[o]therwise limit[ing] a qualified handicapped person in the enjoyment of any right,
privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving an aid, benefit, or service); id. § 84.4(b)(4)
(prohibiting disparate impact on the basis of disability, including “directly or through contractual or other
arrangements, utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified
handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap, [or] (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating
or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program or activity with respect to
handicapped persons”); see also id. § 84.52(4) (prohibiting “[p]rovid[ing] benefits or services in a manner that limits
or has the effect of limiting the participation of qualified handicapped persons”) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R. §
42.503(b)(1), (3) (2019) (prohibiting disparate treatment and disparate impact based on disability); id. § 42.511(a)
(prohibiting the failure to make “reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate, based on the individual
assessment of the applicant or employee, that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of its program or activity”).
151
See supra notes 110-46 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why transition-related care exclusions
violate ADA).
152
42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018).
148
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Section 1557 are the same as those under Section 504.153 Accordingly, transition-related care
exclusions violate Section 1557 for the same reasons that they violate Section 504.154
C.

Employers and Health Insurers are Covered Entities

The ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 apply to employers and health insurers. Because
each of these laws defines covered entities differently, this subpart discusses each law separately.
1.

Title I of the ADA

Under Title I of the ADA, a “covered entity” refers to an entity “engaged in an industry
affecting commerce” that “has 15 or more employees,” and “any agent” of the employer. 155 So
long as an employer is engaged in commerce and has the requisite number of employees, the
employer is a covered entity for purposes of Title I.
The question of whether a health insurer that administers an employer-sponsored health
insurance plan is an agent of the employer, and thus a “covered entity” within the meaning of Title
I of the ADA, is more nuanced. According to the EEOC’s nearly twenty-year-old guidance, the
answer is clearly yes: “[A]n insurance company that provides discriminatory benefits to the
employees of [a separate entity] may be liable under the [equal employment opportunity] statutes
as the [employer]’s agent.”156 The plain language of the ADA strongly supports this interpretation.
The ADA explicitly defines discrimination to include “participating in a contractual or other
arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship
includes a relationship with . . . an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the
covered entity . . . ).”157 In a separate section of the ADA, entitled “Miscellaneous Provisions,”
under the heading, “Insurance,” the ADA expressly states that Title I (and Title III) of the ADA
does not prohibit an insurer or plan administrator “from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
153
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 18116
(2018) (“[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under . . . [section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance . . .
. The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under . . . section [504] . . . shall apply for purposes of
violations of this subsection.”); cf. Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“In view of the similarities between the relevant provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and their
implementing regulations, courts construe and apply them in a consistent manner.”).
154
See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why transition-related care exclusions
violate Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
155
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5)(A) (2018).
156
See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, No. 915.003, 2-III(B)(2)(b) (May 12, 2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html.
157
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2018); see also E.E.O.C. v. Benicorp Ins. Co., No. IP 00-014-MISC, 2000 WL
724004, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2000) (rejecting argument “that an administrator of a health plan is not an
‘employer’ under Title I of the ADA” based, in part, on ADA’s prohibition on discriminatory contractual
arrangements with organizations providing fringe benefits).
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administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.” 158 This same section
further states that an insurer or plan administrator is not prohibited “from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan” so long as the challenged
disability-based distinction is not used “as a subterfuge to evade the purposes” of Titles I (and Title
III) of the ADA.159 Logically, the converse is also true: The ADA does prohibit an insurer or plan
administrator from “underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks” that are
inconsistent with State law, and from using a disability-based distinction as a subterfuge to evade
the ADA’s requirements.160 To the extent that there is ambiguity regarding Title’s I application to
health insurers who administer employer-sponsored health insurance plans, Skidmore deference
should apply to the EEOC’s interpretive guidance. This guidance has remained consistent for
nearly two decades and reflects the “informed judgment” and “body of experience” of the agency
charged with enforcing Title I of the ADA. 161
At least two circuit courts and numerous district courts throughout the Nation have concluded
that a third party administrator can be held liable under Title I of the ADA for “act[ing] on behalf
of the [principal] entity in the matter of providing and administering employee health benefits.” 162
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2018); see also 1993 EEOC Guidance, supra note 52, at § III(A) (“[S]ection 501(c)
permits employers, insurers, and plan administrators to establish and/or observe the terms of an insured health
insurance plan that is ‘bona fide,’ based on ‘underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are
based on or not inconsistent with State law,’ and that is not being used as a ‘subterfuge’ to evade the purposes of the
ADA. Section 501(c) likewise permits employers, insurers, and plan administrators to establish and/or observe the
terms of a ‘bona fide’ self-insured health insurance plan that is not used as a ‘subterfuge.’”).
159
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
160
See id.; see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The exemption for
insurance underwriters whose practices are ‘not inconsistent with State law’ strongly implies that the Act is intended
to reach insurance underwriting practices that are inconsistent with State law. If the ADA were not intended to reach
insurance underwriting under any circumstances, there would be no need for a safe harbor provision exempting
underwriting practices that are consistent with state law.”); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v.
Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154, 1993 WL 596313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (stating that ADA’s inclusion of
subterfuge provision indicated congressional intent to apply Title I of the ADA to administrators of pension plans);
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2019) (“The safe harbor [42 U.S.C. 12201(c)] permits insurers and employers (as sponsors
of health or other insurance benefits) to treat individuals differently based on disability, but only where justified
according to accepted principles of risk classification (some of which became unlawful subsequent to passage of the
ADA).”) (emphasis added).
161
See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (“[T]he [EEOC’s] policy statements,
embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, reflect a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance . . . [and, a]s such, they are entitled to a measure of
respect under the less deferential Skidmore standard.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (stating that EEOC guidance merited Skidmore deference); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (same).
162
Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
1994); see, e.g., Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff
was likely to succeed on merits of claim that employer-sponsored health plan and insurance providers discriminated
based on disability in violation of ADA by covering high dose chemotherapy for certain cancers while denying it for
breast cancer); Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A., 5 F. Supp. 3d 121, 137 (D. Me. 2014) (holding that plaintiff alleged
facts sufficient to show that third party administrator was an agent of the employer under Title I of the ADA);
Benicorp Ins. Co., 2000 WL 724004, at *2 (rejecting argument “that an administrator of a health plan is not an
‘employer’ under Title I of the ADA” based, in part, on ADA’s prohibition on participating in a contractual
arrangement with an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity); Boots v. Nw.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D.N.H. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that employee
158
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Numerous circuit and district courts have likewise held that third party administrators can be held
liable for discriminatory health plans pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
ADEA, both of which share Title I of the ADA’s definition of “employer.”163 Importantly, many
courts have concluded that the determination of who is an “employer” under Title I “will rarely be
resolved on a motion to dismiss [because] . . . this assessment is highly fact-bound. Where a
complaint alleges that a defendant is an employer or agent under the ADA, the allegation alone is
typically sufficient to withstand dismissal.” 164

could sue third party administrator for administering discriminatory employer-sponsored disability benefits plan
under Title I of the ADA); Petty v. El Dorado Eng’g, Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-3203, Civ. A. 95-3812, 1996 WL 191749,
at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 1996) (holding that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to show that third party administrator
was an agent of the employer under Title I of the ADA); see also DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878, 882
(7th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that a municipal board that reviewed employment termination decisions for a
municipality could be liable as an agent under Title I of the ADA if it satisfied Title I’s employee-numerosity
requirement); Oliver v. Spartanburg Reg’l Healthcare Sys. Inc., No. 7:15-4759, 2016 WL 5419459, at *4 (D.S.C.
Sept. 8, 2016) (report and recommendation) (holding that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to show that healthcare
organization that conducted pre-employment physicals was an agent of the employer under Title I of the ADA),
adopted, No. 7:15-4759, 2016 WL 5390312, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2016); EEOC v. Grane Healthcare Co., 2 F.
Supp. 3d 667, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (denying summary judgment to management company that recruited and hired
workforce for employer on grounds that management company was employer’s agent under Title I of ADA); U.S. v.
State of Ill., No. 93 C 7741, 1994 WL 562180, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1994) (holding that plaintiff alleged facts
sufficient to show that administrator of pension benefits may be held liable under Title I of the ADA “because it is
an employer under the ADA or an agent of the employer”); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, 1993 WL
596313, at *1, *7-8 (denying summary judgment to administrator of pension plan and holding that Congress
“clear[ly] . . . intended to cover” such administrators under Title I of the ADA); see also supra note 131 and
accompanying text (collecting cases applying Title I of ADA to third party administrators).
163
See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that third
party insurance company that provided retirement benefits to employees of other employers was an “employer”
under Title VII), vacated and remanded sub nom. Long Island Univ. v. Spirt, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), reinstated on
remand, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 998
(W.D. Wis. 2018) (denying summary judgment to state insurance board and holding that the board, which excluded
transition-related treatment from state employee health insurance plans, was an agent of plaintiffs’ state employers
under Title VII); Jansson v. Stamford Health, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-260, 2017 WL 1289824, at *19 (D. Conn. Apr. 5,
2017) (“[I]f delegated a core employer duty, the third party can incur liability under Title VII.”); Nealey v. Univ.
Health Servs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1368–70 & n.11 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (denying summary judgment to
management company that provided administrative and management services to employer and holding that that
management company was employer’s agent under Title VII); Grossman v. Suffolk Cty. Dist. Attorney’s
Office, 777 F. Supp. 1101, 1104–05 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that employee benefits administrator was “employer”
under ADEA); Graf v. K-Mart Corp., No. 88-1254, 1989 WL 407247, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 1989) (denying
summary judgment to employee benefits administrator and holding that administrator was agent “with respect to
[employer’s] provision of employee benefits under Title VII”).
164
Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A., 5 F. Supp. 3d 121, 135 (D. Me. 2014) (“If a defendant contends that it is
neither the employer nor agent, the wiser course is for the parties to engage in discovery, isolate undisputed and
disputed facts, and present the issue as a matter of law based on a fully developed factual record.”); see, e.g., Oliver,
2016 WL 5419459, at *4 (quoting Brown); Burgie v. Euro Brokers, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 n.11 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (“[C]ourts have frequently found that the question of whether or not someone is an ‘employer’ is a question of
fact better determined on summary judgement than on a motion to dismiss.”); Hollander v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., No. 96 Civ. 4911, 1997 WL 811531, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1997) (stating that “it is unclear at this point
whether defendant is ‘so intertwined’ with plaintiff’s employer . . . that it should be deemed an ‘employer’ or
‘covered entity’”).
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One might argue that Congress included the “agent” language to ensure respondeat superior
liability of the principal for the acts of its agents. Even if true, it does not mean that the agent is
not also liable. Stated another way, an agent’s actions may bind the principal, but the principal
does not automatically assume all of the agent’s legal liability; the agent can be held liable for the
same actions. 165 This is particularly true where the agent being sued is not an individual employee
who could be held personally liable: “[W]here the agent being sued is itself a company who obtains
employer status pursuant to a contractual agreement with the plaintiff’s common law employer,
policy considerations counsel that it ought to be individually liable for its violations of Title
VII.”166 As the Seventh Circuit has stated, agents are liable under Title I of the ADA if they
“otherwise meet the statutory definition of [an] ‘employer,’” namely, if they “ha[ve] the requisite
number of employees and [are] engaged in an industry affecting commerce.” 167
2.

Title III of the ADA

Under Title III of the ADA, a “public accommodation” is a private entity whose operations
affect commerce and fall within one of twelve broad types of businesses. 168 These businesses
range from “place[s] of lodging” (e.g., hotels), to “place[s] of recreation” (e.g., amusement
parks), to “service establishment[s],” the latter of which explicitly include “insurance offices.” 169
The Department of Justice has long interpreted this language to prohibit an insurer from
“discriminat[ing] on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts or in the terms or
conditions of the insurance contracts they offer,”170 as have numerous lower courts, including the
First, Second, and Seventh Circuits. 171 This broad interpretation of public accommodation is
See, e.g., Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n agent can be
individually liable even where his employer is also vicariously liable.”).
166
E.g., Nealey v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
167
DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 1996); see also E.E.O.C. v. Benicorp Ins. Co., No.
IP 00-014-MISC, 2000 WL 724004, at *3, 4 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2000) (stating that “an individual or entity that . . .
otherwise meet[s] the statutory definition of employer”—including “an administrator of a health plan”—“can be
held liable under the ADA”).
168
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
169
Id.; see Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e conclude that a
service establishment is a place of business or a public or private institution that, by its conduct or performance,
assists or benefits someone or something or provides useful labor without producing a tangible good for a customer
or client.”).
170
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, Covering Public Accommodations and
Commercial Facilities III-3.11000, https://www.ada.gov/taman3.html; see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, app. C (1991)
(explicitly rejecting the argument that Title III “does not apply to insurance underwriting practices or the terms of
insurance contracts,” and relying upon “[l]anguage in the committee reports indicat[ing] that Congress intended to
reach insurance practices by prohibiting differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by
public accommodations unless the differences are justified”); see id. (“A few commenters representing the insurance
industry conceded that underwriting practices in life and health insurance are clearly covered.”).
171
See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 1921 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing district court’s dismissal of action and holding that entities that administered
employer-sponsored health insurance plan could be liable under Title III of ADA); see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life
Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Title III of the ADA regulates insurance underwriting
practices); accord Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Fletcher v. Tufts
Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 115 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that employee stated claim that third party administrator of
employer-sponsored health plan violated Title III of ADA by providing inferior benefits to people with mental
165
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consistent with the ADA’s “Insurance” provision, which, as discussed above, explicitly
contemplates Title III’s (and Title I’s) application to an “insurer” that underwrites, classifies, or
administers risks inconsistent with state law, and to insurers and thirty party administrators that
use disability-based distinctions as a subterfuge to evade the ADA’s requirements.172 It is also
consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “public accommodation,” which,
the Court stated in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, “should be construed liberally to afford people with
disabilities equal access to the wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled. 173
This interpretation is likewise consistent with the ADA’s broad remedial purpose, which is to
“invoke the sweep of Congressional authority in . . . order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities,” 174 and with the ADA’s legislative
history, which indicates Congress’s intent that “[t]he term ‘public accommodation’ . . . [be]
defined very broadly” to “include much of the private sector.”175 Indeed, Title III’s broad
coverage was part of a “fragile compromise” struck by the bill’s chief sponsors in the Senate,
who agreed to limit Title III’s remedies to injunctive relief “in exchange for an expansive list of
commercial entities covered by the statute”—a list that includes insurers.176
There are three primary arguments against Title III’s application to transition-related care
exclusions, all of which fail under scrutiny.
(a) “Physical Access Only”
One might first argue that because Title III refers to “places of public accommodation,” and
more specifically, to “insurance office[s],” it is limited to physical access to the facilities of
insurance providers and therefore does not apply to discriminatory health insurance plans. 177
Three circuits—the Third, Sixth, and Ninth—have taken this position.178 Significantly, these
health conditions); Boots v Nw. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214-16 (D.N.H. 1999) (same); supra note
146 and accompanying text (collecting cases applying Title III of ADA to insurers and third-party administrators).
172
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2018).
173
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676–77 (2001) (citing ADA’s legislative history).
174
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018).
175
S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 87 (1989) (views of Sen. Hatch), available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57ebdf73e4fcb538c12657ba/t/5c9d15d1104c7bc3e7dff819/1553798725460/S
enate+Report+101-116.pdf (stating that “public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA “includes not only
businesses covered by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” . . . [but also] retail stores, service establishments, and
other elements of the private sector”); see also PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 675 (“Congress enacted the ADA in
1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals. . . . After thoroughly investigating the
problem [of discrimination against people with disabilities], Congress concluded that there was a compelling need
for a clear and comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to
integrate them into the economic and social mainstream of American life. . . . In the ADA, Congress provided that
broad mandate.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1232
(10th Cir. 2016) (liberally construing the term “service establishment”); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at
19 (same); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C (2019) (stating that ADA’s “representative examples of facilities within each [of
the twelve categories] are not [exhaustive]”).
176
See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 385 (2000)
(citing legislative history).
177
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2018) (emphasis added).
178
See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring
“some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place”); accord Ford v.
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cases represent a circuit split on the issue; they are directly at odds with the First, Second, and
Seventh Circuits, which have concluded that Title III “was meant to guarantee . . . more than
mere physical access” and thus extends to discrimination in insurance underwriting. 179 As the
First Circuit has stated, it “would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to
purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over
the telephone or by mail are not.”180 Indeed, “[i]t is even more difficult to believe that Congress
intended this result to apply to the insurance industry, whose goods and services (insurance
policies) are routinely purchased by customers who never set foot in an insurance office.”181
Interpreting Title III to apply to insurance companies is also consistent with the ADA’s text,
which contains no requirement “that a good or service offered by a place of public
accommodation be purchased on the physical premises of that office in order for the protections
of Title III to apply.”182 Additionally, this interpretation finds support in the ADA’s legislative
history and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) interpretive guidance, both of which expressly
contemplate the ADA’s application to the terms of insurance policies. 183
(b) “Access, Not Content”
One might further argue that, even if Title III applies to health insurance plans, Title III
requires only access to such plans (i.e., provision of the same services to everyone)—it does not
regulate their content (i.e., provision of different services to people with disabilities). 184 This is
the position advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, which held that Title
III did not apply to a health insurance policy that placed a $25,000 cap on lifetime benefits
related to AIDS while providing a $1 million cap on lifetime benefits for other conditions. 185
Importantly, two other circuits—the First and Second—have refused to adopt this argument, and
for good reason.186

Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010
(6th Cir. 1997).
179
Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999); accord Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d
557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994).
180
Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
181
Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997).
182
Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1164.
183
See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ guidance and ADA’s legislative history).
184
See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The common sense of the statute
is that the content of the goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation is not regulated. A camera
store may not refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not required to stock cameras specially designed
for such persons.”).
185
Id. at 558, 563.
186
See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he statute was meant to
guarantee [people with disabilities] more than mere physical access. . . . We therefore hold that Title III . . .
unambiguously covers insurance underwriting in at least some circumstances . . . .”); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc.
v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that public
accommodations “are not limited to actual physical structures,” and that “there is nothing in th[e ADA’s legislative]
history that explicitly precludes an extension of the statute to the substance of what is being offered”).
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First, Doe’s purported distinction between access and content is illusory because it depends
entirely on the level of generality at which one defines the service that is being offered. 187 If one
defines the service at the highest level of generality—for example, access to health insurance,
full stop—an insurer will not be liable unless it outright refuses to insure a person with gender
dysphoria. In short, any health insurance coverage, no matter how disparate its terms, will suffice
for purposes of the ADA. 188 This was the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Doe. 189 When the service
is defined at a slightly lower level of generality, however, transition-related care exclusions are
discriminatory under the Seventh Circuit’s test because they deny access to a service that people
without gender dysphoria receive—namely, health insurance coverage for medically necessary
care. At a still lower level of generality, transition-related care exclusions are discriminatory
because they deny access to health insurance coverage for specific medical procedures that
people without gender dysphoria receive, such as hormone therapy and mastectomies. 190
To illustrate the incoherence of the Seventh Circuit’s access/content distinction, consider the
case of Bragdon v. Abbott, in which the Supreme Court held that the ADA covered a person with
HIV.191 In that case, the patient’s dentist refused to fill her cavity in his office but agreed to
perform the procedure in the hospital, provided that the patient paid for the additional hospital
costs.192 If one defines the service offered at a high level of generality—access to dental
services—there was no discrimination; the dentist agreed to fill the patient’s cavity, albeit at a
higher cost than for those not living with AIDS. 193 However, if one defines the service at a lower
level of generality—access to dental services in a dentist’s office, at the same cost as for those
187
See Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1994) (“[T]here may be areas in which a sharp distinction between [access and content] is illusory.”); see also
Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (D.N.H. 1999) (“This distinction between access and
content, however, is not always clear.”).
188
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 n.21 (1985) (“Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously be
emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is ‘collapsed’ into one’s definition of what is the relevant
benefit.”); see also Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[T]his Court finds that
the distinction drawn by defendants [between denying coverage and providing lesser coverage] is illusory. Both a
decision to deny coverage on the basis of mental disability and to provide inferior coverage for mental disabilities
target the mentally disabled for inferior treatment. In both cases, an insurer has subjected the mentally disabled
individual to treatment inferior to that accorded to others solely on the basis of that individual’s disability.”).
189
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that if “Mutual of Omaha
[were] to take the position that people with AIDS are so unhealthy that it won't sell them health insurance,” this
“would be a prima facie violation of section 302(a),” but concluding that Mutual of Omaha’s caps on AIDS-related
care did not amount to a “refus[al] to sell insurance policies to such persons—it was happy to sell health insurance
policies to the two plaintiffs”) (emphasis added).
190
See Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19-20 (holding that caps on AIDS-related care in employerprovided health plan could constitute discrimination under Title III of ADA); see, e.g., Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215-16 (D.N.H. 1999) (rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s access/content distinction and
holding that plaintiff stated a claim against third party administrator for discriminating against people with mental
health conditions in violation of Title III of the ADA); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425–
26 (D.N.H. 1996) (“This court agrees with plaintiff that under the plain language of Title III, the Act would extend
to the substance or contents of an insurance policy where, as here, the plaintiff has been denied access to insurance
because of his or her disability.”).
191
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
192
Id. at 629.
193
See id.
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not living with AIDS—the dentist did discriminate.194 In granting summary judgment to the
plaintiff, the district court in Bragdon adopted the latter view: by charging a higher price for
dental services, the dentist discriminated against his patient based on her disability. 195
Significantly, the defendant in Bragdon conceded as much, and neither the First Circuit nor the
Supreme Court suggested otherwise.196
Second, Doe’s access/content distinction ignores the plain language of the ADA, which
broadly prohibits not only “outright intentional exclusion,” but also “exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria” that have a disparate impact on people with disabilities, and the “failure to
make modifications to existing . . . practices.” 197 By prohibiting only the outright refusal to
insure people with disabilities, the Seventh Circuit’s access/content distinction ignores the latter
two theories of discrimination contained in the ADA. According to the Seventh Circuit, insurers
have no obligation to alter insurance criteria that screen out people with disabilities or to modify
insurance policies in modest ways, because doing so necessarily implicates the content of (not
access to) insurance policies.198 This is simply not the law; the ADA’s broad articulation of
discrimination applies to all public accommodations, including insurers. 199
Third, Doe’s access/content distinction was premised on two assumptions that are no longer
true given intervening changes to the law. The first assumption was that regulation of the
“content” of insurance would lead to arbitrariness: “Diseases that happened to be classified as
disabilities could not be capped, but equally or more serious diseases that are generally not
disabling, such as heart disease, could be.”200 Even assuming this argument had merit when Doe
was decided in 1999, this argument lacks all force in the wake of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, which broadened the scope of the ADA’s definition of disability to cover medical
conditions—such as heart disease—that are not literally disabling but that would be disabling
when considered in their active state and absent medication or other treatment. 201 Because the
ADA, as amended, now applies to an extraordinarily broad range of medical conditions, 202 there

194

See id.
See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584, 596 (D. Me. 1995), aff’d, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), aff’d
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
196
See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 584. The only issues before the Supreme Court and the First Circuit were
whether the plaintiff had a disability and whether the defendant had an affirmative defense for discriminating. See
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628; Abbott, 107 F.3d at 937-38.
197
42 U.S.C. § 12101(5); see also ADAAA, supra note 66, at § 2(a)(2) (“[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress
recognized that . . . people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from [fully participating in
all aspects of society] . . . because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and
institutional barriers.”); supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text (discussing three theories of discrimination
under ADA).
198
See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560.
199
See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ and agencies’ broad interpretation of
public accommodations under Title III of the ADA).
200
Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559.
201
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D), (E)(i).
202
See id. (“The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.”); ADAAA, supra note
66, at § 2(b)(1) (“reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA”).
195
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is little concern that Title III’s application to the content of insurance would lead to the
arbitrariness that the Seventh Circuit feared.
Doe’s second assumption was that regulation of the “content” of insurance would upend
insurance practices because “most health-insurance policies contain caps,” and insurance
companies have a “right . . . to exclude coverage for an applicant’s pre-existing medical
conditions.”203 This assumption no longer holds true in the wake of the ACA, which largely
eliminated pre-existing condition bans as well as annual- and lifetime-coverage caps.204
Furthermore, application of the access/content distinction to caps on AIDS-related care, as
was the case in Doe, is distinguishable from its application to transition-related care
exclusions. 205 The former implicates limitations on coverage for certain medical treatments,
whereas the latter involves the denial of coverage for certain medical treatments altogether,
which is far more akin to a denial of access than a regulation of content.
(c) “No Application to Employer-Sponsored Insurance”
Lastly, one might argue that, even if Title III reaches the content of health insurance policies,
it applies only to policies issued directly by insurers to individuals—not to employer-sponsored
policies that individuals receive via employment. This argument flatly contradicts not only DOJ
guidance, which draws no such distinction, but also the plain language of the ADA, which
expressly prohibits public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of disability either
“directly, or through contractual licensing, or other arrangements.”206 The Supreme Court
underscored this point in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, stating that Title III “prohibit[s] public
accommodations from discriminating against a disabled ‘individual or class of individuals’ in

203

Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2018) (“Prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions or other discrimination
based on health status”), 300gg-11 (“No lifetime or annual limits”); accord 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.108, 147.126 (2019).
Doe’s access-content distinction was also premised on the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which forbids federal
preemption of state laws that regulate the business of insurance unless the federal law “specifically relates to the
business of insurance.” Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 563. McCarran-Ferguson is not applicable to the ADA’s
prohibition of transition-related care exclusions for two reasons. First, as the Second Circuit has held, “the ADA
does ‘specifically relate to the business of insurance,’ and therefore falls outside the scope of McCarran–Ferguson’s
prohibition.” Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); accord Marques v.
Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare of New England, Inc., 883 A.2d 742, 747 n.13 (R.I. 2005). Second, even if the ADA is
within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Act forbids federal laws that regulate “the business of
insurance,” not the business of self-funded plans administered by third party administrators, who are not involved in
any underwriting or spreading of risk. See Bernard B. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 528 F.
Supp. 125, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that McCarran-Ferguson Act did not forbid application of Rehabilitation
Act to Blue Cross Blue Shield’s exclusion of coverage for hospital services for mental health conditions, and noting
that agreements between Blue Cross and hospitals did not constitute “business of insurance” within McCarranFerguson because they “d[id] not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk, but [we]re merely arrangements for
the purchase of goods and services by Blue Cross”).
205
Cf. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 35 & n.5 (distinguishing insurer’s imposition of cap on benefits for treatment of
AIDS in Doe from insurer’s refusal to offer life insurance policy to people with mental health conditions in Pallozi).
206
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A), (D) (2018) (emphasis added).
204
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certain ways either directly or indirectly through contractual arrangements with other entities,”
and that Title III’s prohibitions therefore “cannot be avoided by means of contract.”207
Accordingly, the First Circuit and numerous lower courts have concluded that an insurer may
not discriminate in the terms of insurance, regardless of whether the insurance “is sold directly to
a disabled individual or made available to that individual indirectly via an employer pursuant to a
contractual or other relationship.” 208 Significantly, the one circuit to reach a contrary result—the
Seventh Circuit—did not address the ADA’s text, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that text
in PGA Tour, Inc., or any other legal authority.209
3.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 applies to public and private entities that receive “[f]ederal financial assistance,”
which includes funds, services, or “[a]ny other thing of value by way of grant, loan, contract, or
cooperative agreement.”210 It is well-established that the term “federal financial assistance” must
be liberally construed “in order to give effect to the broad legislative intent expressed in section
504.”211 As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “Congress intentionally gave broad scope to the term
‘federal financial assistance,’” as demonstrated by “legislative history to the 1974 amendments,
[which] is replete with notations indicating that Section 504 was intended to encompass
programs receiving federal financial assistance of any kind.”212 Accordingly, Section 504 applies
to private insurance companies—including those acting as third party administrators—that
receive, inter alia: Medicare Part A funds213 and, as participants in the federal health insurance
207

532 U.S. 661, 679 (2001).
Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997); see, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr.,
Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that entities that
administered employer-sponsored health insurance plan could be liable under Title III of ADA); see also supra
notes 146, 171 and accompanying text (collecting cases applying Title III of ADA to third party administrators).
209
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan of the Pillsbury Co. and Am. Fed. of Grain Millers, 268 F.3d 456,
459 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (holding, without citation to any statutory, judicial, or administrative authority, that
Title III did not apply to the administrator of an employee retirement plan because “[n]o one could walk in off the
street and ask to become a plan participant. The plan was a private deal, not a public offering.”).
210
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(f) (2019) (DOJ regulations); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h)
(2019) (DHHS regulations).
211
Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau Cty., 772 F.2d 759, 762 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 480 U.S. 273 (1987);
see, e.g., U.S. v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Section 504 “as part of a
broad government policy . . . to prevent discrimination in programs receiving federal assistance”); id. (discussing
“Congress’ clear and consistent purpose to protect handicapped persons and members of minority groups from
discrimination in programs receiving federal assistance”); Jones v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d
1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The Rehabilitation Act is remedial in nature. As a general matter, courts eschew
narrow interpretations of remedial statutes. Instead, remedial statutes are normally accorded broad construction in
order to effectuate their purpose.”); Dorer v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900 (D. Md. 1998)
(discussing “broad remedial thrust of the Rehabilitation Act”); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967) (recognizing the “familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes”).
212
Arline, 772 F.2d at 762 n.9, aff’d, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (emphasis added).
213
See, e.g., Austin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., No. 4:09-1647-VEH, 2009 WL 10703738, at *1
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (permitting the plaintiff to amend complaint to include Rehabilitation Act claim against insurer
based on insurer’s receipt of Medicare, Part A funds, and concluding that such a claim was not futile based on, inter
alia, the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion in Arline, 772 F.2d at 762 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
208
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marketplace under the ACA, direct payments from the federal government related to individual
consumers who receive tax credits or cost-sharing reductions in order to help them purchase
insurance.214
4.

Section 1557 of the ACA

Private insurance companies, including those acting as third party administrators, are
explicitly covered by Section 1557 of the ACA, which applies to “any health program or activity,
any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or
that the term “federal financial assistance” must be interpreted broadly); Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135,
155 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that plaintiff stated claim that employer and third party administrator violated
Rehabilitation Act by providing inferior disability benefits to people with mental health conditions); Bernard B. v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 528 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that third party administrator Blue Cross Blue Shield’s receipt of Medicare, Part A funds could
“constitute[] federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act” because funds “may play a
part in enabling Blue Cross to carry on both Medicare and non-Medicare activities” and are thus “in the nature of a
subsidy as opposed to a procurement contract”); see also U.S. v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that “Medicare and Medicaid are federal financial assistance for the purpose of Section 504”);
id. at 1048 (holding that, even if Section 504 exempted a “contract of insurance or guaranty” from the definition of
federal financial assistance, “neither Medicare nor Medicaid is the type of contractual program Congress intended to
exempt. As the legislative history makes abundantly clear, in excluding ‘contracts of insurance or guaranty,’
Congress intended to prevent Section 504 from reaching ‘individually owned homes financed with federally
guaranteed mortgages, or individual bank accounts in a bank with federally guaranteed deposits.’”) (citations
omitted); Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14–cv–2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *13 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015)
(“[C]ourts . . . have resoundingly held that Medicare and Medicaid payments constitute federal financial assistance
for, at least, the purposes of section 504 . . . .”) (compiling cases); Dorer v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d
898, 900 (D. Md. 1998) (“[R]eceipt of Medicare or Medicaid funds by any entity (even one at a remove from direct
patient care) will bring the Rehabilitation Act into play.”); Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143,
149 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing “long line of cases” holding that “Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements . . .
constitute ‘federal financial assistance’ for purposes of . . . Section 504”); United States v. Univ. Hosp. of State
Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Examination of the legislative history
of the Medicaid and Medicare programs shows that Congress contemplated that receipt of funds under these
programs would subject the recipient to coverage under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which
[Section 504] is modeled.”), aff’d on other grounds, 729 F.2d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1984); accord Zamora-Quezada v.
HealthTexas Medical Group of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Howe v. Hull, 874 F.
Supp. 779, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Mass. 1991); cf. Moore v. Sun Bank
of North Fla., N.A., 923 F.2d 1423, 1429-32 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that national bank’s participation in federal
guaranteed loan program constituted receipt by the bank of “federal financial assistance” pursuant to Section 504,
and declining to follow Department of Health, Education, and Welfare regulations that exclude a “contract of
insurance or guaranty” from the definition of federal financial assistance, holding that such exclusion was “an
impermissible construction of section 504”). Consistent with Section 504’s broad remedial purpose, courts in the
above cases easily concluded, often without discussion, that the defendant was a “program or activity” under Section
504. See, e.g., Bernard B. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 528 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (stating that “Blue Cross is the recipient of Medicare, Part A funds” and, therefore, “[t]he question is whether
Blue Cross’ receipt of such funds constitutes federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2018) (defining program or activity to include “all of the operations” of various
public and private entities, “any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance”) (emphasis added); accord
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (2019); 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(h) (2019).
214
42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(3) (2018) (“[T]he Secretary of the Treasury makes advance payments of such credit or
reductions to the issuers of the qualified health plans in order to reduce the premiums payable by individuals eligible
for such credit.”) (emphasis added).
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contracts of insurance.”215 Section 1557’s specific reference to “credits” and “subsidies” makes
clear that Section 1557’s anti-discrimination mandate applies to private insurance companies that
receive federal tax credits and subsidies through their participation in the federal health insurance
marketplace.216 Such an interpretation is also consistent with Section 1557’s remedial purpose,
which is to “address[] the problem of those who cannot obtain insurance coverage because of
pre-existing conditions or other health issues,”217 and with the failure of Congress to exclude
private insurers explicitly from Section 1557.218 As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, a court “act[s]
beyond [its] authority” when it reads into civil rights laws “limitations which Congress chose not
to establish when it clearly could have done so.”219 Accordingly, the fact that an insurer acts as a

215

42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018); see also Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL
1197415, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (“[A]s long as part of an organization or entity receives federal funding or
subsidies of some sort, the entire organization is subject to the anti-discrimination requirements of Section 1557.”).
216
42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(3) (2018) (discussing “advance payments of such credit or reductions to the issuers of
the qualified health plans”); see also Griffin v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:15–CV–4439, 2017 WL 3449607, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 6, 2017) (discussing Section 1557’s application “not only to public insurance such as Medicare and
Medicaid, but also to the private insurance market and many employer-sponsored insurance plans”); Letter from 138
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to The Honorable Mick Mulvaney, Director, Office of Management
and Budget 1-2 (May 23, 2018), https://juliabrownley.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Letter_to_OMB_05_23_18.pdf (stating that “[i]n drafting and enacting the Health Care
Rights Law, members of the 111th Congress, including many of the signatories of this letter, clearly and
unambiguously intended the Health Care Rights Law to prohibit sex discrimination in health care,” which
encompasses the decision by “health care providers—including insurance companies, hospitals, and doctors—to
deny people health care because of the provider’s personal beliefs”) (emphasis added); Valarie K. Blake, An
Opening for Civil Rights in Health Insurance After the Affordable Care Act, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 235, 238
n.21 (2016) (“The broadening of civil rights law into private [insurance] markets [under the ACA] is a direct effect
of these entities receiving federal dollars.”); Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil
Rights, Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 873 (2012) (“Section 1557’s specificity that federal
financial assistance includes ‘credits’ and ‘subsidies’ unequivocally establishes that Section 1557’s
antidiscrimination mandate covers private insurance companies, physicians, and other providers who will be
receiving new federal tax credits and subsidies authorized by the ACA.”) (emphasis added).
217
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547 (2012); see, e.g., Richards v. Gov’t of Virgin
Islands, 579 F.2d 830, 833 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Remedial legislation is traditionally construed broadly, with exceptions
construed narrowly.”) (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
218
Cf. Arline, 772 F.2d at 762 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to interpret “federal financial assistance” under
Section 504 to exclude impact aid absent a “specifically delineated exception to the statute”), aff’d, 480 U.S. 273
(1987).
219
Id. at 762; see also Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980) (“Where Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”). On May 24, 2019, the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of
Health and Human Services issued a proposed rule that would repeal and replace portions of its 2016 regulations
implementing Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Katie Keith, HHS Proposes To Strip Gender Identity,
Language Access Protections From ACA Anti-Discrimination Rule, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 25, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190525.831858/full/. To the extent that the Department’s final
regulations do not apply to private insurers that receive credits and subsidies through their participation in the
federal health insurance marketplace, the regulations are undeserving of Chevron deference because they are at odds
with the plain language of Section 1557 and congressional intent. See supra notes 215-220 and accompanying text;
cf. Moore v. Sun Bank of North Fla., N.A., 923 F.2d 1423, 1431 (11th Cir. 1991) (declining to defer to Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare’s restrictive interpretation of “federal financial assistance” under Section 504
because it was inconsistent with “the plain language of section 504, the failure of Congress to amend the
Rehabilitation Act to exclude [the financial assistance at issue in the case], and the clearly expressed intent of
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third party administrator of a discriminatory plan does not undermine coverage; as the District of
Minnesota has stated, “[n]othing in Section 1557, explicitly or implicitly, suggests that [third
party administrators] are exempt from the statute’s nondiscrimination requirements.” 220
D.

The ADA’s “Safe Harbor” is Inapplicable

Unlike Section 504 and Section 1557, the ADA provides a “safe harbor” for certain
disability-based health insurance plan distinctions. 221 Generally speaking, § 12201(c) of the
ADA permits employers and their agents (under Title I) and private insurers (under Title III) to
discriminate on the basis of disability in the provision of health insurance so long as they can
show that the health insurance plan is “bona fide” and the challenged disability-based distinction
is not being used as a “subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADA].”222 A plan is “bona fide”
if “it exists and pays benefits, and its terms have been accurately communicated to
employees.”223 A plan’s disability-based distinction is not being used as a “subterfuge” if it is
“justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability,” for example: if the treatment
sought “does not provide any benefit (i.e., has no medical value)”; if the disability-based
distinction “is attributable to the application of legitimate risk classification and underwriting
procedures to the increased risks (and thus increased cost to the health insurance plan) of the
disability, and not to the disability per se”’; or if the desired coverage “would have been so
expensive as to cause the health insurance plan to become financially insolvent” or resulted in “a
drastic increase in premium payments (or in co-payments or deductibles), or a drastic alteration
to the scope of coverage or level of benefits provided.”224 Whether a disability-based health
Congress in providing broad remedy for handicapped discrimination in programs receiving ‘Federal financial
assistance’”).
220
Tovar v. Essentia Health, 342 F. Supp. 3d 947, 954 (D. Minn. 2018) (declining to “construe ERISA to
impair Section 1557”).
221
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2018); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (2019) (applying safe harbor to entities
covered under Title I of ADA); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2019) (applying safe harbor to entities covered under Title III of
ADA).
222
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2018). If the health insurance plan is not an employer-sponsored self-funded plan,
and is therefore “subject to State laws that regulate insurance,” there is an additional requirement: the plan must also
be “based on or not inconsistent with State law.” 42 U.S.C § 12201(c)(1)-(2) (2018); see also 1993 EEOC Guidance,
supra note 52, at § III(C)(1) (distinguishing between “insured plan[s]” and “self-insured plan[s]”).
223
1993 EEOC Guidance, supra note 52, at § III(C)(1).
224
Id. at § III(C)(2); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
III-3.11000 (“[A] public accommodation . . . may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit
the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based
on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience. The ADA, therefore, does
not prohibit use of legitimate actuarial considerations to justify differential treatment of individuals with disabilities
in insurance.”); Technical Assistance Letter from Bill Lan Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice to the Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, United States Senate (Nov. 16, 1999),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/americans-disabilities-act-technical-assistance-letters-49 (“The ADA, therefore, does not
prohibit the use of legitimate actuarial considerations to justify differential treatment of individuals with disabilities
in insurance.”).
Agency interpretations of the ADA’s safe harbor provision are consistent with the ADA’s legislative history.
See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 85 (stating that a health insurance plan may not refuse or limit insurance based on a
physical or mental impairment, “except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial
principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience”); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71 (1990)
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insurance plan distinction falls within the ADA’s safe harbor “is determined on a case by case
basis, considering the totality of the circumstances,” and the burden of proof is on the
defendant.225
In the context of transition-related care exclusions, employers and private insurers cannot
meet their burden for two reasons. First, it is beyond cavil that transition-related care has medical
value; for over a half-century, the medical community has recognized transition as a safe and
effective means of treating gender dysphoria. 226 Second, there simply is no actuarial basis for
excluding transition-related care, particularly where the very treatments that health plans label as
“transgender healthcare”—including hormone therapy, mastectomy, hysterectomy, phalloplasty,
and vaginoplasty—are routinely covered when they are administered to non-transgender
people. 227 As numerous courts have held, a disability-based health insurance plan distinction
does not fall within the ADA’s safe harbor absent proof of an actuarial basis. 228
(reporting that the “ADA requires that underwriting and classification of risks be based on sound actuarial principles
or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience”).
225
1993 EEOC Guidance, supra note 52, at § III(C)(2); see, e.g., Zamora-Quezada v. HealthTexas Med. Grp.
of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (rejecting “defendants’ affirmative defense argument
they are insulated from liability and protected from further proceedings in this case by the safe harbor provision of
the ADA”); see also 1993 EEOC Guidance, supra note 52, at § III(C) (“Requiring the respondent to bear th[e]
burden of proving entitlement to the protection of [42 U.S.C. 12201(c)] is consistent with the well-established
principle that the burden of proof should rest with the party who has the greatest access to the relevant facts. In the
health insurance context, it is the respondent employer (and/or the employer’s insurer, if any) who has control of the
risk assessment, actuarial, and/or claims data relied upon in adopting the challenged disability-based distinction.
Charging party employees have no access to such data, and, generally speaking, have no information about the
employer provided health insurance plan beyond that contained in the employer provided health insurance plan
description.”).
226
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
227
See supra notes 114, 128-30 and accompanying text.
228
See, e.g., Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 432 (D.N.H. 1996) (denying summary
judgment to insurer under Title III of the ADA because genuine issue of fact existed as to whether insurer’s denial
of mortgage disability insurance to woman with bipolar disorder was based on sound actuarial principles); accord
Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 77, 83 (D.N.H.
1997) (denying summary judgment to defendant third party administrators under Titles I and III of the ADA because
genuine issue of fact existed as to whether defendants’ caps on AIDS-related care was based upon “unlawful
discriminatory animus and/or upon unreasonable speculation regarding the medical and fiscal threat posed by the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and AIDS”), on remand from, 37 F.3d 12 (1994); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 964 F. Supp. 299, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (denying summary judgment to insurer under Title III of the ADA
because genuine issue of fact existed as to whether insurer’s denial of life insurance to gay man whose partner had
HIV was based on sound actuarial principles); id. (“It defies the spirit of the ADA for the Court to accept
Prudential’s proffer of vague explanations of the risks of HIV infection where the business of insurance requires
sound risk assessment practices. Because plaintiff has pointed to evidence revealing the possibility of discriminatory
denial of an insurance policy, Prudential can only prevail on summary judgment by coming forward with actuarial
or other data supporting its actions.”); Morgenthal ex rel. Morgenthal v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc.,
No. 97 Civ. 6443, 1999 WL 187055, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (“finding it premature, on a motion to dismiss, to
determine whether defendant’s policy was exempted by the safe harbor provision”) (citing Hollander v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., No. 96 Civ. 4911, 1997 WL 811531, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1997)); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (denying motion to dismiss and stating that “[i]t is
possible that the decision to deny plaintiff coverage was not based on considerations of underwriting or classifying
risks, in which case plaintiff might be entitled to recover under the ADA. Also, even though an insurer may claim to
be basing a denial of coverage on actuarial or classification of risk considerations, that claim is not conclusive as the
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CONCLUSION
There is no legitimate reason to deny insurance coverage for transition-related care. The
consensus of the mainstream medical community, backed by decades of clinical experience, is
that transition-related care is a medically necessary and effective treatment for gender
dysphoria. 229 Furthermore, the cost of coverage for transition-related care, is, in the words of at
least two federal district courts, “immaterial,” given the small fraction of people who utilize such
care.230 Therefore, when insurers offer and employers adopt healthcare plans that exclude
transition-related care, they necessarily do so out of indifference—or, worse, hostility—toward
the health and safety of people with gender dysphoria. 231 This Essay argues that such treatment
constitutes disability discrimination.
Fortunately, transition-related care exclusions are in decline. 232 When confronted with the
injustice of targeting gender dysphoria treatments for exclusion from health plans, most private
employers have voluntarily removed the exclusion.233 But the same is not true with respect to
public employers. In 2018, for example, a transgender employee named Skyler Jay sued his
employer, the University of Georgia, for excluding coverage for transition-related care in
violation of, inter alia, Title VII, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.234 The
question of whether section 12201(c)(1) is being used as a subterfuge would remain.”); Mason Tenders Dist.
Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154, 1993 WL 596313, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (stating
that the ADA prohibited ERISA trustees from denying benefits “on the basis of . . . actuarial assumptions,” which
“are jury issues that cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment”); Marques v. Harvard Pilgrim
Healthcare of New England, Inc., 883 A.2d 742, 752 (R.I. 2005) (denying summary judgment to insurer under Title
III of the ADA because genuine issue of fact existed as to whether insurer’s denial of health insurance to man with,
inter alia, orthopedic impairment was based on sound actuarial principles); see also 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, app. C (2019),
Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities (July 26, 1991) (“Because the legislative history of the ADA clarifies that different treatment
of individuals with disabilities in insurance may be justified by sound actuarial data, such actuarial data will be
critical to any potential litigation on this issue. This information would presumably be obtainable in a court
proceeding where the insurer’s actuarial data was the basis for different treatment of persons with disabilities.”)
(emphasis added).
229
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing medical consensus that hormonal and surgical
treatment to align physical sex characteristics with one’s gender identity is medically necessary and successful in
alleviating gender dysphoria).
230
See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (citing Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d
1001, 1021-22 (W.D. Wis. 2019) and Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 1000-01 (W.D. Wis. 2018)).
231
See, e.g., TLDEF Files Federal Lawsuit Against Houston County, Georgia for Excluding MedicallyNecessary Transgender Health Care in Employee Health Plan, TLDEF (Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter TLDEF Press
Release], http://www.transgenderlegal.org/headline_show.php?id=985 (“By denying coverage for [an employee’s
transition-related care, the employer] . . . is showing complete disregard for her health and well being. . . . Rejecting
an employee’s medical needs is negligent and reckless.”) (quoting Kayla Gore, Southern Regional Organizer for
Transgender Law Center@SONG); see also Lange Compl. ¶105, supra note 12 (“[T]he only conceivable purpose of
the [exclusion of transition-related care] is its effect: to single out transgender people undergoing a gender transition
for inferior compensation as compared to their colleagues, and to unlawfully seek to avoid paying for a stigmatized
form of health care”).
232
See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing trend toward coverage for transition-related care
in public and private health insurance).
233
TLDEF Press Release, supra note 231 (citing Senior Staff Attorney Noah Lewis).
234
See Musgrove Compl. ¶6, supra note 12.
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following year, the University settled the lawsuit, agreeing to remove the exclusion and
compensate Mr. Jay $100,000.235 And, in 2019, police Sargent Anna Lange sued her employer,
Houston County, Georgia, for excluding transition-related care, alleging that such an exclusion
constitutes both sex and disability discrimination under federal and state law. 236 That case
remains pending.
More lawsuits await and disability rights law will continue to play an important role. In the
words of Mr. Jay, the practical effect of the exclusion of coverage for transition-related care is to
deny “life-saving access to care” for people with gender dysphoria. 237 Such a result is untenable,
and it is precisely one that disability rights law should remedy.
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See Keren Landman, Sheriff's Deputy Sues Her County To Get Health Coverage For Transgender-Related
Care, NPR (Oct 2, 2019 9:42 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/02/766252365/sheriffsdeputy-sues-her-county-to-get-health-coverage-for-transgender-related-c.
236
See id.
237
Andy Peirotti, Georgia University System Agrees to Cover Transgender Healthcare, 11ALIVE (Oct. 2, 2019)
(quoting Skyler Jay).
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